History Podcasts

Valor II AM-472 - History

Valor II AM-472 - History

Valor II

(AM-472: dp. 776; 1. 172'; b. 36'; dr. 10', s. 14 k.; cpl.
70; a. 1 40mm., 2 .60-car. mg.; cl. Aggressive)

The second Valor (AM - 72) was laid down on 28 April 1952 at Manitowoc, Wis., by the Burger Boat Co.; launched on 13 May 1953; sponsored by Mrs. Walter J. Kohler; towed through the Great Lakes and down the St. Lawrence River to Boston, Mass. and commissioned at Boston on 29 July 1954, Lt. C`arles R. Davis in command.

Following preliminary trials, Valor joined Mine Division (MinDiv) 82, Mine Squadron (MinRon) 8, Mine Force, Atlantic Fleet, on 14 September. Immediately thereafter, she steamed to Key West, Fla., where she conducted shakedown training through the end of the year. In February 1966, she entered the Charleston Naval Shipyard for an extensive overhaul. On the 7th of that month, she was redesignated MSO472.

Valor completed repairs and modifications in October and rejoined the Mine Force, though on a detached assignment at the Engineering Experimental Station

at Annapolis, Md., as an engineering prototype. That phase of testing ended on 23 November, and Valor returned to Charleston but continued experimental duty until December. After that, the minesweeper began normal duty with the Atlantic Fleet Mine Force based at Charleston. That service—broken only by a voyage to Halifax, Nova Scotia, in April and May of 1956 and by a six-month deployment to the Mediterranean Sea from 29 August 1967 to 12 February 1968 —lasted until March of 1968.

On 1 March 1968, she began a 10-year association with the Navy Mine Defense Laboratory located at Panama City, Fla. On 16 March, she departed Charleston and, on the 29th, arrived in her new home port. In July of 1969, after 16 months of duty at Panama City—punctuated by an overhaul at Charleston during the winter of 1958 and 1959—Valor took her first break from mine countermeasures development work when she was deployed to northern European waters. Departing Charleston on 24 July, the minesweeper arrived in Ostend, Belgium, on 11 August. There, she changed operational control from the United States Navy to the Belgian Force Navale and joined the Belgian Minesweeper Division 191. On 17 August, she and the other elements of the division departed Ostend for a voyage to the waters surrounding the Belgian Congo.

The warships arrived in Congolese waters on 9 September and commenced a series of multinational minesweeping exercises involving American, Belgian, and Portuguese units. The exercises ended on 21 September, and Valor and her division mates headed back to Ostend where they arrived on 17 October. Valor continued to operate locally out of Ostend, with the Belgian minesweeper division, until 15 January 1960 when she returned to United States Navy control and headed—via Rota, Spain—back to the United States. The minesweeper arrived back in Panama City, Fla., on 14 February 1960.

Over the next eight years, Valor continued to operate out of Panama City in support of the mine countermeasures development program of the Navy Mine Defense Laboratory. However, that routine was broken frequently—on three occasions by six-month deployments to the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, but more often by overhauls, refresher training and exercises in the West Indies. Her association with the Mine Defense Laboratory ended on 1 March 1968 when she received orders transferring her to MinDiv 44 and reassigning her to Charleston as her home base.

The ship operated from that port for the remaining two years of her Navy career. During that period Valor made one more deployment to the Mediterranean between April and August of 1968. Early in October 1969, the minesweeper began a pre-rehabilitation overhaul at Charleston in preparation for extensive modifications to update her equipment. She never finished those modifications for, early in 1970, a board of inspection and survey found her to be beyond economical repair and recommended that she be disposed of. She was decommissioned sometime in July 1970, and her name was struck from the Navy list on 1 February 1971, On 30 August 1971, she was sold to Mr. Charles Gural, of Rakway, N.J., for scrapping.


Quotes about courage that that can inspire your decision making

Difficult choices often require courage to motivate change. Use these quotes about courage to embolden your decision making.

"The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy." - Martin Luther King Jr. (1929 - 1968), American Clergyman and Civil Rights Activist

"It is from numberless diverse acts of courage and belief that human history is shaped. Each time a man stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a million different centers of energy and daring, those ripples build a current that can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance." - Robert F. Kennedy (1925 - 1968), American Politician and Civil Rights Activist

"Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen." - Winston Churchill (1874 - 1965), British Politician

"Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more violent. It takes a touch of genius - and a lot of courage - to move in the opposite direction." - Ernst Friedrich Schumacher (1911 - 1977) British Economic Thinker and Statistician

"To sin by silence when they should protest makes cowards of men." - Abraham Lincoln (1809 - 1865), 16th President of the United States

"Every man has his own courage, and is betrayed because he seeks in himself the courage of other persons." - Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803 - 1882), American Poet and Essayist

"Behold the turtle. He makes progress only when he sticks his neck out." - James Bryant Conant (1893 - 1978) American Chemist and President of Harvard University

"Everyday courage has few witnesses. But yours is no less noble because no drum beats for you and no crowds shout your name." - Robert Louis Stevenson (1850 - 1894), Scottish Novelist, Poet, and Essayist

"The secret of Happiness is Freedom, and the secret of Freedom, Courage." - Thucydides (460 BC - 395 BC), Greek Historian

"Cowardice asks the question: is it safe? Expediency asks the question: is it politic? Vanity asks the question: is it popular? But conscience asks the question: is it right? And there comes a time when one must take a position that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular- but one must take it simply because it is right." - Martin Luther King Jr. (1929 - 1968), American Clergyman and Activist

"Courage is doing what you're afraid to do. There can be no courage unless you're scared." - Edward Vernon Rickenbacker (1890 - 1973), American Fighter Ace in World War I

"It is easier to find a score of men wise enough to discover the truth than to find one intrepid enough, in the face of opposition, to stand up for it." - Archibald Alexander Hodge (1823 - 1886), American Presbyterian Leader and Principal of Princeton Seminary

"One man with courage makes a majority." - Andrew Jackson (1767 - 1845), Seventh President of the United States


Like many British manufacturers, AC Cars had been using the Bristol straight-6 engine in its small-volume production, including its AC Ace two-seater roadster. This had a hand-built body with a steel tube frame, and aluminium body panels that were made using English wheeling machines. The engine was a pre-World War II design by BMW which by the 1960s was considered dated. In 1961 Bristol decided to cease production of its engine.

In September 1961, American retired race car driver and automotive designer Carroll Shelby wrote to AC asking if they would build him a car modified to accept a V8 engine. Bristol engines for the AC Ace two-seater sports car had recently been discontinued so AC agreed, provided a suitable engine could be found. Shelby went to Chevrolet to see if they would provide him with engines, but not wanting to add competition to the Corvette they said no. However, Ford wanted a car that could compete with the Corvette and they happened to have a brand new engine which could be used in this endeavor: the Windsor 3.6-litre (221 cu in) engine – a new lightweight, thin-wall cast small-block V8. Ford provided Shelby with two engines.

In January 1962 mechanics at AC Cars in Thames Ditton, Surrey designed the "AC Ace 3.6" prototype with chassis number CSX2000.

AC had already made most of the modifications needed for the small-block V8 when they installed the 2.553-litre (156 cu in) inline 6 Ford Zephyr engine, including the extensive rework of the AC Ace's front end bodywork. The only modification of the front end of the first Cobra from that of the "AC Ace 2.6" was the steering box, which had to be moved outward to clear the wider V8 engine.

The most important modification was the fitting of a stronger rear differential to handle the increased engine power. A Salisbury 4HU unit with inboard disc brakes to reduce unsprung weight was chosen instead of the old E.N.V. unit. It was the same unit used on the Jaguar E-Type. After testing and modification, the engine and transmission were removed and the chassis was air-freighted to Shelby in Los Angeles on 2 February 1962, [9] By this time the small-block's displacement was increased to 4.3 L (260 cu in).

Shelby's team paired this engine along with a transmission into CSX2000, in less than eight hours at Dean Moon's shop in Santa Fe Springs, California, and began road-testing. [10]

A few changes were made to the production version:

  • The inboard brakes were moved outboard to reduce cost.
  • The fuel tank filler was relocated from the fender to the center of the trunk. The trunk lid had to be shortened to accommodate this change.

AC exported completed, painted, and trimmed cars (less engine and gearbox) to Shelby who then finished the cars in his workshop in Los Angeles by installing the engine and gearbox and correcting any bodywork flaws caused by the car's passage by sea. A small number of cars were also completed on the East Coast of the US by Ed Hugus in Pennsylvania, including the first production car CSX2001.

The first 75 Cobra Mk1 models (including the prototype) were fitted with the 4.3 L (260 cu in). [10] The remaining 51 Mk1 models were fitted with a larger version of the Windsor Ford engine, the 4.7-litre (289 cu in) V8.

In late 1962, Alan Turner, AC's chief engineer completed a major design change of the car's front end to accommodate rack and pinion steering while still using transverse leaf spring suspension (with the leaf spring doubling as the upper suspension link). The new car entered production in early 1963 and was designated Mark II. The steering rack was borrowed from the MGB while the new steering column came from the VW Beetle. About 528 Mark II Cobras were produced from 1963 to the summer of 1965 (the last US-bound Mark II was produced in November 1964). [11]

In 1963 to keep production focused on producing cars for Shelby American Inc., the Ruddspeed Ace was discontinued. To supply cars to the European market, AC began to market and sell the Cobra in Europe. Advertisements from the time state that the Cobra was designed to meet the requirements of Shelby American Inc.

Shelby experimented with a larger Ford FE engine, of 6.4 L (390 cu in) in chassis number CSX2196. Unfortunately, the car was not able to receive the development it needed, as resources were aimed at taking the crown from Ferrari in the GT class. Ken Miles drove and raced the FE-powered Mark II at Sebring and pronounced the car virtually undrivable, naming it "The Turd". It failed to finish with the engine expiring due to damper failure.

CSX2196 was revised for the showdown at Nassau which allowed a more relaxed class division of racing. This allowed the Cobras to run with a prototype Ford GT40, GM Grand Sport Corvettes and a Lola Mk6. An aluminium 6.4-litre (390 cu in) engine was used. By the end of the first lap, the Cobra had a lead of the length of the start-finish straight. However, the car failed to finish due to brake problems.

A new chassis was required, developed, and designated Mark III. The new car was designed in cooperation with Ford in Detroit. A new chassis was built using 101.6 mm (4 in) main chassis tubes, up from 76.2 mm (3 in) and coil spring suspension all around (an especially significant change up front, where the previously-used transverse leaf spring had done double duty as the top link). The new car also had wide fenders and a larger radiator opening. It was powered by the "side oiler" Ford 7.0 L (427 cu in) FE engine equipped with a single 4-barrel 780 CFM Holley carburetor rated at 317 kW (425 hp 431 PS) at 6000 rpm and 651 N⋅m (480 lb⋅ft) at 3700 rpm of torque, [12] which provided a top speed of 264 km/h (164 mph) in the standard model. The more powerful tune of 362 kW (485 hp 492 PS) with a top speed of 298 km/h (185 mph) in the semi-competition (S/C) model.

Competition models (CSX/CSB 3001–3100)

Cobra Mark III production began on 1 January 1965 two prototypes had been sent to the United States in October 1964. Cars were sent to the US as unpainted rolling chassis, and they were finished in Shelby's workshop.

Unfortunately, The MK III missed homologation for the 1965 racing season and was not raced by the Shelby team. Only 56 of the 100 planned cars were produced. Of those, 31 unsold competition models were detuned and fitted with windscreens for street use. Called S/C for semi-competition, an original example can currently sell for US$1.5 million, making it one of the most valuable Cobra variants. [13]

Production models (CSX/CSB 3101–3360)

Some Cobra 427s were actually fitted with Ford's 7-litre (428 cu in) engine, a long stroke, smaller bore, lower cost engine, intended for road use rather than racing. The AC Cobra was a financial failure that led Ford and Carroll Shelby to discontinue importing cars from England in 1967.

AC Cars kept producing the coil-spring AC Roadster with narrow fenders and a small block Ford 289. It was built and sold in Europe until late 1969.

Dragon Snake Edit

Shelby offered a drag package, known as the Dragon Snake, which won several NHRA National events with Bruce Larson or Ed Hedrick at the wheel of CSX2093. [14]

Only six 289 Dragon Snake Cobras were produced by the factory. 2019, 2357 as factory team cars. 2248, 2416, 2427, 2472 as private team cars.

One 427 Dragon Snake, 3198.

Cobras were also prepared by customers using the drag package. Examples include: 2075, 2093, 2109, 2353, and 3159 "King Cobra."

Slalom Snake Edit

Designed for auto-cross events, only two examples were produced. Both had white exterior paint (with red racing strings) and red leather interiors.

Equipped almost identically to CSX2522, this second example had aluminum valve covers, a tuned air cleaner, a Smiths heater, seat belts, front and rear brake cooling ducts, a hood scoop, brake cooling scoops, side exhausts and a painted roll bar (2522's roll bar was chromed). Suspension options included Koni shock absorbers, front and rear anti-sway bars, unpolished six-inch magnesium pin-drive wheels, and Goodyear Blue Streak Sports Car Special tires.

Super Snake Edit

In 1966, CSX 3015 S/C was selected and converted into a special model called the Supersnake the "Cobra to End All Cobras." Originally part of a European promotional tour before its conversion. This conversion called for making the original racing model street legal with mufflers, a windshield and bumpers amongst other modifications. But some things were not modified, including the racing rear end, brakes and headers. The most notable modification is the addition of Twin Paxton Superchargers, TPS.

Shelby crafted a second model, CSX 3303, from a street version. CSX 3303 was given to comedian Bill Cosby, his close friend. When Cosby attempted to drive CSX3303, he found that it was very difficult to keep under control he later recounted the experience on his 1968 stand-up comedy album 200 M.P.H.. Cosby gave the car back to Shelby, who then shipped it out to one of his company's dealers in San Francisco, S&C Ford on Van Ness Avenue. S&C Ford then sold it to customer Tony Maxey. Maxey, suffering the same issues as Cosby did with the car, had his throttle stick while leaving a traffic stop, lost control and drove it off a cliff, landing in the Pacific Ocean waters. [15]

Shelby used his CSX 3015 as a personal car over the years, sometimes entering it into local races like the Turismos Visitadores Cannonball-Run race in Nevada, where he was "waking [up] whole towns, blowing out windows, throwing belts and catching fire a couple of times, but finishing." [16] CSX3015 was auctioned on 22 January 2007, at the Barrett-Jackson Collector Car Event in Scottsdale, Arizona, for $5 million plus commission (£2.8 million), a record for a vehicle made in the U.S. [17]

AC also produced the AC 428 Frua on a stretched Cobra 427 MK III coil spring chassis. The steel body was designed and built by Pietro Frua until 1973.

The American Electric Car Company used an even further modified chassis for their vehicles.

One 244-centimetre (96 in) prototype chassis (CSX 3063) was shipped to Ghia in Italy in 1965 for a body styling exercise. This vehicle was first displayed during a European car show with a Cobra license tag. An article about the car was written up in the Winter 65/66 edition of "Style Quarterly" magazine. Shelby American internal production records show that the car was shipped to Shelby American for Evaluation and review. AC Cars Ltd internal production records show that Shelby American placed an order for two 96-inch chassis (CSX 5001–5002) in 1966. AC labeled these chassis as "GHIA CONVERTIBLE" in their factory ledger.

Shelby American internal production records show that the car was shipped to Shelby American for evaluation and review in early 1966. The vehicle was returned to Ford and now resides in the Detroit Historical Museum.

Autokraft manufactured an AC 289 continuation car called the Autokraft Mk IV, basically a Mk III with a 4.95-litre (302 cu in) Ford V8 and Borg Warner T5 Transmission. The Mk IV also received an independent suspension.

In 1986, Autokraft (as a joint venture with Ford joining in 1987) purchased AC Cars, and produced the AC Mk IV Cobra, with a 186 kW (250 hp 253 PS) at 4,200 rpm, 4,942-cubic-centimetre (301.6 cu in) Ford V8, which provided a top speed of 134 mph (215 km/h) and 0–62 mph (0–100 km/h) in 5.2 seconds.

At the 1990 Geneva Salon the Lightweight version was presented: weight was down to 1,070 kg (2,360 lb) (compared to 1,190 kg or 2,620 lb) and power was up to 276 kW (370 hp 375 PS) at 5,750 rpm thanks to alloy heads, a Holley four-barrel carburettor, and no catalytic converter. [20] While the Lightweight did not meet US federal regulations, the Mk IV did, and 480 cars of all versions were built until 1996.

In 1996 the company was purchased by Pride Automotive. Two new 'Cobra' style cars were launched in 1997, the 'Superblower', an aluminium-bodied car with a supercharged 4,942-cubic-centimetre (301.6 cu in) Ford V8 providing 239 kW (320 hp 324 PS) and the cheaper 'Carbon Road Series' (CRS) with a carbonfibre body and a 168 kW (225 hp 228 PS) version of the Ford V8 engine. 22 Superblowers and 37 CRSs were built between 1997 and 2001.

In 1999, a limited edition run of 25 289 FIA Cobras were planned. Only 1 example was manufacturered, chassis number COB 1001.

A further variant, 'the 212 S/C' with a 3,506-cubic-centimetre (213.9 cu in) 261 kW (350 hp 355 PS) twin-turbocharged Lotus V8 engine was introduced in 2000, but only two examples were built.

In 2001, the company relocated its factory to Frimley, Surrey. By August 2002, the company was in a financial low and briefly acquired by Private Corp, who closed operations in October 2003. Only two models were produced, a FIA 289 (COX 2610), and a 427 Cobra (COX 3361). The cars were intended to be sold in the US market, through a new company, AC Cars USA, in Florida. Both cars were numbered following where the original ledger entries left off during the 1960s.

On 8 July 2002, a new company was formed in Malta named AC Motor Holdings and was responsible for the branding of the company.

In late 2003, the Frimley factory was under the control of AC Motor Holdings.

On 4 December 2003, Shelby and AC announced a co-production of the CSX1000 and CSX 7500 series. Only 14 CSX1000, and 2 CSX 7500 cars were built by 2007.

Between 2004 and 2007, AC Motor Holdings produced the AC Mk V in their Malta factory. However, only 3 right-hand drive and 2 left-hand drive carbon-fibre AC Mk Vs powered by 254 kW (340 hp 345 PS) 5-litre (305 cu in) Ford V8 engines were built before the Maltese operation closed.

On 20 April 2008, AC announced its Heritage Series, the UK operations were granted to Brooklands Motor Company, dba AC Heritage. The US operations were granted to AC AutoKraft, Llc, of Michigan.

Both companies are licensed to produce traditional aluminum-body models: Ruddspeed, 289, and 427 continuation Aces and Cobras.

In 2009, AC licensed Gullwing GmbH in Germany, dba AC-Automotive, to produce the AC MK VI, with an aluminium coated composite body and powered by a 6.2-litre (380 cu in) 328-kilowatt (440 hp 446 PS) LS3 Chevrolet engine, or a 410 kW (550 hp 558 PS) supercharged version.

In 2012, the AC Mrk II Classic was released. Available in either aluminum or fiberglass bodies.

In 2017, the AC Mrk1 260 Legacy edition was released in a limited production of nine cars. Also released was the AC 378 a newer composite body version of the Cobra.

In an effort to improve top speed along the legendary Mulsanne Straight at the 24 Hours of Le Mans race, a number of enclosed, coupe variations were constructed using the leafspring chassis and running gear of the AC/Shelby Cobra Mark II. The most famous and numerous of these were the official works Shelby Daytona Cobra Coupes. Six were constructed, each being subtly different from the rest.

AC Cars also produced a Le Mans coupé. The car was a one-off and was nearly destroyed after a high-speed tire blow-out at the 1964 Le Mans race. The car was qualified conservatively second in GT. The race started well with the AC, chassis number A98, maintaining its position in the top two in GT and even leading the class for a time. This was not to last as an act of sabotage (newspaper in the fuel tank) began to block the fuel filter. The car lost time until this was diagnosed and cleaned out. [ citation needed ] The car proceeded on at the predetermined conservative lap time and for the next stint remained trouble free. The car was able to match the Shelby Daytona's speed despite running a higher differential ratio (2.88 instead of 3.07) and a lower state of engine tune for reliability (265 kW [355 hp 360 PS] instead of the Daytona's 287 kW [385 hp 390 PS]).

The Willment race team became interested in Shelby's Cobra-based coupe and inquired on purchasing one. Shelby turned down the offer, but supplied the drawings to Willment. Dubbed the Willment Cobra Coupe, this car was fully built by the JWA racing team and numbered 2131 on the frame.

A prototype (CSX 3027) was to become 427 Coupe, but since the focus was shifted towards the GT program, this project received little attention. The bodywork and chassis were soon scrapped. [21]

Two further chassis were ordered number CSX 3054 and CSX 3055. This project was also abandoned with just CSX 3054 receiving a body. CSX 3055 was sold to the Willment Race Team and was fitted with a Fiat body designed by Ghia.

In 1993, the Los Angeles Times exposed a Carroll Shelby scheme [22] to counterfeit his own cars. With the price of an original 427 c.i. Cobra skyrocketing, Shelby had, by his own written declaration executed under penalty of perjury, caused the California Department of Motor Vehicles (the government agency responsible for titling vehicles and issuing operator permits) to issue forty-three "Duplicate Titles" for vehicles that did not officially exist in company records. A letter from AC Cars confirmed the fact that the chassis numbers Shelby had obtained titles for were never manufactured, at least not by AC Cars. Only fifty-five 427 c.i. Cobras had been originally produced out of a block of serial numbers reserved for 100 vehicles. Shelby had taken advantage of a loophole in the California system that allowed one to obtain a duplicate title for a vehicle with only a written declaration, without the vehicle identification number appearing in the DMV's database or the declarant ever presenting an actual vehicle for inspection. [23] Shelby admitted that the chassis had been manufactured in 1991 and '92 by McCluskey Ltd, an engineering firm in Torrance, California, and were not original AC chassis, [23] however Shelby denied having misled anyone and said he was a victim of a campaign by Brian Angliss, a British competitor, who owned AC at the time and was also building Cobras from the original tooling and wished to enhance his sales by smearing Shelby's car. [23]

Since the late 1980s onwards, various companies have built what are known in the hobby as "Continuation Cars".

Shelby authorized continuations of the original AC-built Cobra series. Produced in Las Vegas, Nevada, these cars retain the general style and appearance of their original 1960s ancestors, but are fitted with modern amenities. The initial version for continuation was a 427 S/C model which was represented in the CSX4000 series. This was meant to continue where the last 427 S/C production left off, at approximately serial number CSX3360 in the 1960s.

The initial CSX4000 series cars were completed from the chassis built by McCluskey Ltd as well as other new parts and reconditioned Ford engines. Given the value of the vehicle many "extra" cars have appeared over the years, even some sharing the same chassis number. Gradually as the vintage parts supply ran low, newly constructed frames and body panels were obtained from a variety of suppliers. The production of chassis numbers CSX4001 to CSX4999 took roughly 20 years and many different business relationships to complete.

In 2009, CSX4999 was produced, concluding the 4000 series. Production has continued with the CSX6000 serial numbers, featuring "coil over" suspension.

The 289 FIA "leaf spring" race version of the car is reproduced as CSX7000, and the original "slab side" leaf spring street car is the CSX8000 series. The Daytona Coupe is reproduced as the CSX 9000 series.

To date most continuations are produced in fiberglass, with some ordering cars with aluminium or carbon-fibre bodywork.

In 2004, at the North American International Auto Show in Detroit, Ford unveiled a concept for a modernized AC Cobra. The Ford Shelby Cobra Concept was a continuation of Ford's effort to bring back the retro sports cars that had been successful in the 1960s, including the Ford GT40 and the fifth generation Ford Mustang.

In 2014, Shelby American announced a limited edition production of 50 cars for the 50th anniversary of the original 427 Shelby Cobra. [2] [24]

During the continuation period, Kirkham Motorsports were contracted by Shelby to produce rolling Cobra body/chassis units but this did not end amicably. Pete Brock said in a Hot Rod magazine interview "Like the Kirkhams, even when they were supplying most of Shelby’s Cobra parts. Shelby would go to them and say he would buy their entire year’s worth of production and sign a contract. They called me and asked if they should do it and I said, "As long as you get the money up front, but if you let a car out the door, you’ll lose money." Shelby paid that way for two years and then finally [Kirkhams] got a great big order and Shelby's truck driver said he forgot to bring the check. He went back with a bunch of cars on the transporter and Shelby told them he wasn't going to pay them—that they owed it to him. That almost put [Kirkhams] out of business." [ citation needed ]


Watch Live as a Rare Bald Eagle ‘Throuple’ Raises Their New Trio of Chicks

This spring’s hottest drama has everything: a deadbeat father, a love triangle, murder, redemption and lots and lots of freshwater fish. But the excitement isn’t unfolding on cable television, it’s streaming live from a webcam set up on a stretch of the Upper Mississippi Wildlife Refuge in Illinois where a rare trio of bald eagles successfully hatched three puffy chicks in early April.

Ally Hirschlag at Audubon reports that a female bald eagle named Starr and her two paramours, Valor I and Valor II, are currently tending to three hatchlings in their stick nest overlooking the Mississippi near Lock and Dam 13 in Fulton, Illinois. Hundreds of bird species are known to use “helpers,” single birds that hang around a mated pair and help carry food to young or incubate eggs. But the phenomenon is extremely rare in bald eagles, which are monogamous, mate for life and highly territorial.

A study from the 1990s documented bald eagle trios in Alaska, Minnesota and Santa Catalina Island in California in which a third bird helped incubate eggs and feed hatchlings. But this trio is different because the two male eagles, Valor I and Valor II, have stuck together, even inviting a new female eagle into their bromance when their original partner was killed.

The saga begins in 2012, reports Michelle Lou and Brandon Griggs at CNN. That’s when Hope and her mate Valor I first appeared on a webcam operated by the Stewards of the Upper Mississippi River Refuge. The eagles soon had eggs in the nest. But Valor proved to be a negligent father.

“Normally they will switch roles, but what happened was Hope would sit on the nest for a long, long time,” Pam Steinhaus, the Wildlife Refuge’s visitor services manager tells Hirschlag. “Valor I would never bring food in, so she’d have to get up and leave to hunt.”

When Hope was away, Valor would sit on the nest for 10 minutes or so before hopping off. Because it was a warm winter, the eggs hatched, but the chicks didn’t last long they died before fledging.

During the 2013 nesting season, a new bird joined the cast. Valor II began hanging around the nest and soon took Valor I’s spot without much of a fight. That year, Hope and Valor II fledged chicks, while Valor I hung around the nest site, looking on.

Camera issues made it difficult to track the trio in 2014 and 2015. When the camera was fixed in 2016, viewers found that the eagle throuple had become a well-oiled, co-parenting machine. All three birds took turns building and managing the nest, incubating the eggs and hunting to feed the young.

In March 2017, however, tragedy struck while the trio was tending to two eaglets. Hope was attacked by other eagles and eventually disappeared from the nest cam. It’s likely the attack killed her or she was so severely injured that another predator picked her off. The boys, however, stepped up, feeding and protecting the eaglets until they fledged.

In September 2017, Starr soared into the lives of the male eagles and the three were seen fixing and tidying up the nest. In 2018, they produced two eaglets, though one died. This year, the trio hatched three eaglets, all of which currently appear healthy and should be ready to fledge in a few weeks. It’s possible that the eagles are fathered by both Valor I and Valor II since each were seen mating with Starr.

Steinhaus tells CNN that while Starr did most of the egg incubation, the male eagles forced her to take a break. “The boys are right there to remove her and sit on the eggs,” she says.

Now that the eaglets are feeding, Valor I and Valor II have taken on their share of the hunting as well. “The pantry is constantly full. Food is never going to be an issue,” Steinhaus adds.

Why Valor I and Valor II have maintained the avian throuple is unknown. It’s particularly perplexing because bald eagles are extremely territorial, says Robyn Bailey, NestWatch project leader at Cornell University’s Lab of Ornithology. Bailey tells Audubon’s Hirschlag that Valor I must be benefitting from the situation, perhaps through an “increased likelihood of his offspring surviving.”

Steinhaus says that eagles have a strong bond with successful nesting sites, so Valor I and Valor II may remain civil because both are attached to the nest they used to share with Hope. As long as the trio keeps producing successful fledglings, she says, the drama will likely continue.

About Jason Daley

Jason Daley is a Madison, Wisconsin-based writer specializing in natural history, science, travel, and the environment. His work has appeared in Discover, Popular Science, Outside, Men’s Journal, and other magazines.


Military Payment Certificate

Military Payment Certificates (MPC) were issued from 1946 until 1973. They were printed in fifteen series and used in 22 different countries during that 27 year period. The denominations issued range from as little as five cents all the way up to twenty dollars. Military payment certificates were intended to be used by members of the United States military who were serving overseas. That means that U.S. MPCs can be found all over the world today. They have been very well researched. In most situations we have records of exactly how many were printed and we usually have a pretty good idea of how many are still known to exist. This makes collecting military payment certificates fairly easy.

Who Collects Military Payment Certificates?

Why Are Some MPCs Very Rare?
Military payment certificates are really starting to get a strong following as a legitimate type of collectible paper money. They are really the newest type of paper money that is considered collectible. The bad news is that about 97% of MPCs are extremely common (like worth less than $5). However, some can be rare. Military payment certificates are not good at their face value today. Each series was devalued when a new one was issued. Of course the soldiers and other personnel didn’t want to get stuck with worthless money. So there was an extremely strong incentive to exchange your old series for the new series. Typical survival rates don’t apply to military payment certificates like it does to other currency. Something printed relatively recently and in high numbers could actually be very rare because most would have been destroyed on conversation day.

Military Payment Certificate Value Guide

We have more value information on other pages. However, we can give you some quick tips to know whether or not your MPC might be rare. So the first thing you want to look at it is the serial number. If the serial number on your bill does not end with a letter then you have what is known as a replacement note. Some replacement notes can be especially rare. Feel free to contact us directly to find out exactly what your note is worth.

The following notes are considered at least somewhat rare:
Series 471 $5
Series 481 $5 (4 th printing)
Series 521 $5 (both printings)
Series 541 $5
Series 541 $10
Series 591 $5
Series 591 $10

As you can see, it is really only the higher denomination MPCs that have the chance to be rare. Of course any replacement serial could be a keeper, even on lower denominations. However, nothing under than $5 denomination will ever be a super rarity on its own. Keep in mind that condition is still very important when you are dealing with military payment certificates. Even extremely common notes can be worth decent money if they are in absolutely perfect condition. For example, the value of the most common MPC might be $1 in average condition. However, the price could be as much as $40 if it is gem uncirculated. Simply put, there is a demand for high grade common notes and there is virtually no demand for low grade common notes.

Counterfeit Military Payment Certificates

Do fake MPCs exist? Yes, lots of contemporary counterfeits were made. These were not produced to deceive collectors. The ones that still exist were meant to be used at face value in commerce when military payment certificates were still circulating. You are more likely to see counterfeits on the higher denomination notes. Most counterfeits are of very poor quality and not at all deceiving. The people making MPC counterfeits were the citizens of the country in which the U.S. military was stationed. They saw it as an easy way to make a profit, especially when their home country’s currency was likely close to worthless. Fakes are pretty easy to spot because they will be lacking the red and blue colored planchettes found in authentic notes. The serial numbers also almost always the wrong font as well. Details and colors can be slightly off, which is standard on many counterfeits. If you think you might have a fake, then send us an email with pictures. We can quickly tell you if your military payment certificate is authentic.

Military Payment Certificates Errors & Other Items of Interest

It is rare to find significant errors on MPCs but they do exist. Inverts and cutting errors are about as extreme as it gets in terms of misprints. You will also occasionally see specimens of military payment certificates. Those are also extremely rare.


Waltham During the Civil War Years

In January, 1859 the Waltham Improvement Co. and the Appleton, Tracy & Co. merged to form the "American Watch Company."

The dial department of the Waltham Watch factory.

In 1860, as Abraham Lincoln was elected President and the country found itself in the throes of the Civil War, the American Watch Company was faced with serious financial problems. By 1861, business had come to a standstill and bankruptcy seemed inevitable. The factory was kept in operation through these years by cutting expenses to the lowest possible level. a strategy that proved successful.

According to the biography by Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln owned and carried a Waltham "Wm. Ellery" watch. The watch was an 11-jewel, 18 size, key-wind in a silver hunter case, and was produced in January of 1863.

In 1885, the company became the "American Waltham Watch Company". In 1865 prices for movements only (no case) were: William Ellery $13, P. S. Bartlett $16, Bartlett-Ladies $30, Appleton Tracy $38, A. T. & Co Ladies $40, and American Watch Grade $175!

In 1906 the company was renamed the "Waltham Watch Company". In 1923, they became the "Waltham Watch and Clock Company" reflecting the new importance of clock manufacturing, but then in 1925 the name was changed back to "Waltham Watch Company".

American Horology owes much to the brilliant visionaries of the Waltham Watch Company. Bacon, Church, Dennison, Fogg, Howard, Marsh, Webster, and Woerd all contributed greatly to American watchmaking.

Waltham continued to manufacture watches (and clocks) until 1957, when they ceased production and became the Waltham Precision Instrument Company. The rights to the name "Waltham Watch Company" were sold to the Hallmark Watch Company of Chicago, Illinois who continued to sell imported watches using the Waltham name. Several of the original Waltham factory buildings are still standing, and were added to the National Register of Historic Places in 1989.

Waltham Named Grades

In addition to using grade numbers, Waltham also used many grade names on their watches, often choosing the names of Board members, company investors, or other prominent individuals. The grade name basically designates the model and/or level of finish of the watch. Some of the more popular Waltham named grades were:

P. S. Bartlett, Appleton Tracy & Co., William Ellery, Crescent Street, Colonial, Riverside, Central Park, Broadway, Royal E. Robbins, Vanguard, Bond Street, Sterling, Premier, Royal, and Maximus.

Modern Waltham Watches

It is still possible to purchase modern quartz watches that bear the Waltham name, but these watches are unrelated to the "genuine" American Waltham Watch Company. In fact, a 1961 ruling by the Federal Trade Commission prohibited any inference that a relationship to the original Waltham Watch Company exists.

The bustling traffic outside the Waltham Watch factory at noon


German Panzer IV – Workhorse of the Wehrmacht in Photos

The German Panzerkampfwagen IV medium tank, abbreviated PzKpfw IV, Pz. IV, or T-IV, was created by Friedrich Krupp AG. Production started in 1937 and continued until the very end of the Second World War. The Pz. IV became one of the most mass-produced Wehrmacht tanks, with 8,686 units built.

The Pz. IV was modified and improved nine times throughout its production, so it remained relevant in use throughout the war. Depending on the modification of the tank, the mass was from 18.4 to 25 tons.

Panzer IV Ausf. C, 1943.Photo Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-J08365 CC-BY-SA 3.0

The tank body consisted of forged steel, rolled armor with a hardened surface. The tank had three compartments separated by bulkheads: a control, a fighting, and a power compartment.

The thickness of the armor was, depending on the modification, from .4 to 3.15 inches. Starting in 1943, .2″ thick shields were also installed to help protect the sides and the back of the tower from anti-tank rifles and shells.

Panzer IV tank at Duxford.Photo Gregd1957 CC BY-SA 3.0

Pz.IV tanks were produced with the following weapons:

– Modifications A-F had KwK37 75-mm guns.
– Modification G had a KwK40 75-mm gun with a barrel length of 43 calibers.
– Modifications H-K had a KwK40 75-mm gun with a barrel length of 48 calibers.

A Panzer IV Ausf. E showing signs of weapon impacts on the turret and the edge of the gun barrel.Photo: Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-783-0117-113 Dörner CC-BY-SA 3.0

The tanks were additionally equipped with two 7.92-mm MG-34 machine guns. They carried enough ammunition for 80-87 75-mm shots, as well as 2,700-3,150 cartridges for the machine guns.

The short-barreled Panzer IV Ausf. F1. Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1979Anh.-001-10 CC-BY-SA 3.0

The Pz.IV was equipped with a V-shaped 12-cylinder four-stroke carburetor engine for liquid cooling, using engine models HL 108TR, HL 120TR, and HL 120TRM from Maybach. Depending on the model of the engine, the power was from 250 to 300 hp.

The maximum speed reached by the tank on highways was 25 mph. Their range was about 124 to nearly 200 miles, depending on road conditions and tank modifications. The crew consisted of 5 people.

The 300 horsepower Maybach HL 120TRM engine used in most Panzer IV production models.Photo: Stahlkocher CC BY-SA 3.0

Pz.IVs were used during the Anschluss of Austria, and later during the occupation of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia.

Soviet tankman Grigory Panezhko, in his book Notes of a Soviet Officer (Записки советского офицера) recalls the first meeting with the German Panzer IV tank in June 1941: “We froze when we saw the ugly, monstrous tanks of bright yellow tiger color appearing from Sitno gardens. They slowly rolled in our direction, sparkling with tongues of shots.”

A Panzer IV Ausf. G in desert colours, bearing the palm tree insignia of the 15th Panzer Division of the Afrika Korps.Photo aku13 CC BY-SA 3.0

The Pz.IV was widely used in all theaters of military operations during World War II. For example, these tanks comprised about 60% of all German tanks involved in Operation Citadel. After the appearance of the Panther, it was planned to cease production of the Pz.IV, but thanks to General Guderian this did not happen.

Soldier during a Training on a Panzer IV.Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-J08352 CC-BY-SA 3.0

In addition, this tank was exported, and for a long time it was in service in Finland, France, Croatia, Bulgaria, Spain, and other countries.

PzKpfw IV Ausf J in Finnish Tank Museum, Parola.Photo Balcer CC BY 2.5

The Pz. IV was repeatedly used after the Second World War. It participated in the 1956 Suez conflict, the 1948-1949 Israel War of Independence, the 1967 Six-Day War, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, and several other conflicts.

‘PzKpfw IV J, captured from the Syrian Army in the Six Day War, in Yad la-Shiryon Museum, Israel. 2005.Photo Bukvoed CC BY 2.5

Panzer IV Ausf. C 1943.Photo Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-J08365 CC-BY-SA 3.0

A British Crusader tank passing a burning German Panzer IV during Operation Crusader, late 1941.

A captured German PzKpfw IV G used for anti-tank weapon tests by British Eighth Army, Italy 1943

A Panzer IV Ausf. G of the 1st SS Panzer Division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” near the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, 1942. Bundesarchiv, Bild 101III-Zschaeckel-170-20 Zschäckel, Friedrich CC-BY-SA

A Panzer IV-A performing a water crossing exercise demonstration while being observed by Wehrmacht officers on the shore. Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1978-120-15 CC-BY-SA 3.0

A PzKpfw IV Ausf. H of the 12th Panzer Division carrying Schürzen skirting operating on the Eastern Front in the USSR, 1944. Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-088-3734A-19A Schönemann CC-BY-SA 3.0

France, Panzer IV moving trough a village.Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-721-0378-28 Vennemann, Wolfgang CC-BY-SA 3.0

German Panzer-IV, version “D” on a training exercise in March 1940.Photo Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-124-0211-18 Gutjahr CC-BY-SA 3.0

Officers inspect a German Mk IV tank knocked out by the Durham Light Infantry, 11 June 1944.

Pz.Kpfw IV Ausf J in Finnish Tank Museum, Parola.Photo Balcer CC BY 2.5

Pz.Kpfw-IV in Belgrade Military Museum, Serbia.Photo PetarM CC BY-SA 4.0

PzKpfw IV Ausf G in Yad la-Shiryon Museum, Israel.Photo Bukvoed CC BY 2.5

PzKpfw IV in Batey ha-Osef Museum, Israel.Photo Bukvoed CC BY 2.5

The 1942 Panzer IV Ausf. F2 was an upgrade of the Ausf. F, fitted with the KwK 40 L 43 anti-tank gun to counter Soviet T-34 medium and KV heavy tanks.Photo Mark Pellegrini CC BY-SA 2.5

The Ausf. J was the final production model, and was greatly simplified compared to earlier variants to speed construction. This shows an exported Finnish model.Photo: Balcer CC BY 2.5


How to look up Bronze Star awards

How do I look up award ribbons, specifically Bronze star for soldiers?

Re: How to look up Bronze Star awards

Typically when medals were issued they were issued by the higher command and the HQ level. They were issued in General Orders. If you have more information people here have other resources to help you. But if you have not done so you can request your relatives military records and the citation or GO# will be listed on their discharge papers.

Re: How to look up Bronze Star awards

Which soldier?  Which war?  Do you have his or her unit information?

Re: How to look up Bronze Star awards
Rebecca Collier 21.05.2020 16:21 (в ответ на mike keane)

Thank you for posting your request on History Hub!

Unfortunately, there is no name index for Bronze Star awards. The citations are issued at various levels of the military hierarchy. The Official Military Personnel File of a U.S. soldier will list the general order citation that includes the unit or command that issued the award. We suggest you begin there.

Several non-official websites list Bronze Star recipients such as Wall of Valor , American War Library , Ranker.com , and Wikipedia Commons but they are incomplete.

We hope this is helpful. Best of luck with your research!

Re: How to look up Bronze Star awards

If for US Army Air Forces or US Air Force, between the dates 1942 - 1963 - take a look at the link below.

You can search to see if there is a digital copy of the service member's "Award Card". Some are digitized, some are not, but it's worth checking.

Re: How to look up Bronze Star awards

If the Bronze Star Medal was for Meritorious Service this example shows you the kind of information which would be available in a typical US Army General Order for WWII

And this example shows you the information which would be available for a Bronze Star Medal for Gallantry (Valor) for US Army in WWII. 


RAM Air IV Cam Specs

Pontiac's Ram Air IV engine was the fourth evolution of an engine that had helped to create the muscle car as we know it. Premiering in the 1967 Pontiac GTO/Firebird, the 400 cubic-inch RA-I produced 360 horsepower using a large camshaft, a bespoke intake and cast-iron exhaust headers along with unique cylinder heads. Two evolutions later, the incredible RA-IV used one of the most massive camshafts of the musclecar era to produce some of the lowest quarter-mile times of its day.

Basic Description

The RA-IV camshaft is a hydraulic flat-tappet camshaft with a dual-pattern design. This camshaft was essentially identical to the RA-II, which used one of the very first computer-designed camshafts ever to enter production. The RA-II camshaft's engineers used their computers to develop a powerful and efficient dual-pattern cam, meaning that the cam uses different lobe designs for the intake and exhaust-side cam lobes. The RA-IV's cam was nearly identical to the RA-II's, so it uses the same dual-pattern design as its predecessor.

Essentially, the RA-IV was an RA-II with a new aluminum intake manifold and 1.65-to-1 rocker arms. These rocker arms were about nine percent longer than the RA-II's 1.5-to-1 rocker arms, pushing the valves open nine percent further while utilizing the same camshaft. The RA-II/IV camshaft had 0.313-inch lift on the intake and exhaust lobes, which yielded 0.470-inch lift with the RA-II's 1.5-to-1 rocker arms and 0.516-inch lift with the RA-IV's longer rocker arms.

Duration

If the Muscle Car Era had a guiding philosophy, it was surely "bigger is better." The RA-II/IV's camshaft posted some of the most radical duration figures ever used for a production car. These cams would have made most small-block cars of the era cackle and lope like dragsters, but the RA-series' 400 cubic-inch displacement and "torquey" nature helped to tame the cam a bit. Although its advertised duration was a healthy 308-degrees intake/320-degrees exhaust, the cam's duration at 0.050-inch valve lift is what really set it apart. This cam came with an at-0.050-inch duration of 231-degrees intake and 240-degrees exhaust, which is almost impractically large even by modern roller-cam standards. As a frame of reference, the 1997 Firebird SLP's 330- horsepower LT4 engine used a cam with 203-degrees intake/210-degrees exhaust duration at 0.050-inch lift.

Lobe Separation Angle

The RA-IV's lobe separation angle was fairly wide, which is the only aspect of this cam that you could describe as moderate. The RA-II/IV cam's computer-aided design allowed it to use a conservative 113-degree LSA while still making good high-end horsepower. This wide LSA reduced valve overlap, which is a measurement describing how long the intake and exhaust valves remain open at the same time. Less valve overlap means better low-rpm torque and increased fuel efficiency --"fuel efficiency" being a relative term by 1960's standards. As a frame of reference, the similar but less-advanced RA-III used a cam with a 110-degree LSA, and the 1997 Firebird SLP's rollerized lifters allowed it to use a cam with a 115-degree LSA. This is telling, considering the fact that an 1969 RA-III Firebird got about 13 mpg while its 1997 equivalent could get close to 35 mpg.


Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001)

The requirement of an intelligible principle does not compel Congress to set numerical guidelines for the EPA in order to avoid violating the non-delegation doctrine under Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution. This doctrine generally is applied narrowly, and similar language has been deemed sufficient to guide an agency decision-maker in the past. The agency should be allowed to have some discretion in setting the guidelines. However, the agency decision-maker does not have the discretion to consider the financial impact of its environmental regulations. The Clean Air Act contains no support for the view that Congress intended cost to be a relevant factor in the agency's determinations.

Concurrence

Concurrence

Concurrence

WHITMAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL. v. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 99-1257. Argued November 7, 2000-Decided February 27, 2001*

Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which "air quality criteria" have been issued under § 108. Pursuant to § 109(d)(1), the Administrator in 1997 revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Respondents in No. 99-1257, private parties and several States (hereinafter respondents), challenged the revised NAAQS on several grounds. The District of Columbia Circuit found that, under the Administrator's interpretation, § 109(b)(1)-which instructs the EPA to set standards "the attainment and maintenance of which . are requisite to protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety"-delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution, and it remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The Court of Appeals also declined to depart from its rule that the EPA may not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. And it held that, although certain implementation provisions for the ozone NAAQS contained in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA did not prevent the EPA from revising the ozone standard and designating certain areas as "nonattainment areas," those provisions, rather than more general provisions contained in Subpart 1, constrained the implementation of the new ozone NAAQS. The court rejected the EPA's argument that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the implementation question because there had been no "final" implementation action.

1. Section 109(b) does not permit the Administrator to consider implementation costs in setting NAAQS. Because the CAA often expressly grants the EPA the authority to consider implementation costs, a provision for costs will not be inferred from its ambiguous provisions. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U. S. 246,257, and n. 5. And since

*Together with No. 99-1426, American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. v. Whitman, Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

§ 109(b)(1) is the engine that drives nearly all of Title I of the CAA, the textual commitment of costs must be clear Congress does not alter a regulatory scheme's fundamental details in vague terms or ancillary provisions, see MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231. Respondents' arguments founder upon this principle. It is implausible that § 109(b)(1)'s modest words "adequate margin" and "requisite" give the EPA the power to determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards. Cf. ibid. And the cost factor is both so indirectly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn from direct health effects that it would have been expressly mentioned in §§ 108 and 109 had Congress meant it to be considered. Other CAA provisions, which do require cost data, have no bearing upon whether costs are to be taken into account in setting the NAAQS. Because the text of § 109(b)(1) in its context is clear, the canon of construing texts to avoid serious constitutional problems is not applicable. See, e. g., Miller v. French, 530 U. S. 327,341. pp.464-471.

2. Section 109(b)(1) does not delegate legislative power to the EPA.

When conferring decisionmaking authority upon agencies, Congress must lay down an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform. J. W Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409. An agency cannot cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute. The limits that § 109(b)(1) imposes on the EPA's discretion are strikingly similar to the ones approved in, e. g., Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, and the scope of discretion that § 109(b)(1) allows is well within the outer limits of the Court's nondelegation precedents, see, e. g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388. Statutes need not provide a determinate criterion for saying how much of a regulated harm is too much to avoid delegating legislative power. Pp.472-476.

3. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the implementation issue under § 307 of the CAA. The implementation policy constitutes final agency action under § 307 because it marked the consummation of the EPA's decisionmaking process, see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154. The decision is also ripe for review. The question is purely one of statutory interpretation that would not benefit from further factual development, see Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U. S. 726, 733 review will not interfere with further administrative development and the hardship on respondent States in developing state implementation plans satisfies the CAA's special judicialreview provision permitting pre enforcement review, see id., at 737.

WHITMAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL. v. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 99-1257. Argued November 7, 2000-Decided February 27, 2001*

Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which "air quality criteria" have been issued under § 108. Pursuant to § 109(d)(1), the Administrator in 1997 revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Respondents in No. 99-1257, private parties and several States (hereinafter respondents), challenged the revised NAAQS on several grounds. The District of Columbia Circuit found that, under the Administrator's interpretation, § 109(b)(1)-which instructs the EPA to set standards "the attainment and maintenance of which . are requisite to protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety"-delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution, and it remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The Court of Appeals also declined to depart from its rule that the EPA may not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. And it held that, although certain implementation provisions for the ozone NAAQS contained in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA did not prevent the EPA from revising the ozone standard and designating certain areas as "nonattainment areas," those provisions, rather than more general provisions contained in Subpart 1, constrained the implementation of the new ozone NAAQS. The court rejected the EPA's argument that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the implementation question because there had been no "final" implementation action.

1. Section 109(b) does not permit the Administrator to consider implementation costs in setting NAAQS. Because the CAA often expressly grants the EPA the authority to consider implementation costs, a provision for costs will not be inferred from its ambiguous provisions. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U. S. 246,257, and n. 5. And since

*Together with No. 99-1426, American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. v. Whitman, Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

§ 109(b)(1) is the engine that drives nearly all of Title I of the CAA, the textual commitment of costs must be clear Congress does not alter a regulatory scheme's fundamental details in vague terms or ancillary provisions, see MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231. Respondents' arguments founder upon this principle. It is implausible that § 109(b)(1)'s modest words "adequate margin" and "requisite" give the EPA the power to determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards. Cf. ibid. And the cost factor is both so indirectly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn from direct health effects that it would have been expressly mentioned in §§ 108 and 109 had Congress meant it to be considered. Other CAA provisions, which do require cost data, have no bearing upon whether costs are to be taken into account in setting the NAAQS. Because the text of § 109(b)(1) in its context is clear, the canon of construing texts to avoid serious constitutional problems is not applicable. See, e. g., Miller v. French, 530 U. S. 327,341. pp.464-471.

2. Section 109(b)(1) does not delegate legislative power to the EPA.

When conferring decisionmaking authority upon agencies, Congress must lay down an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform. J. W Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409. An agency cannot cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute. The limits that § 109(b)(1) imposes on the EPA's discretion are strikingly similar to the ones approved in, e. g., Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, and the scope of discretion that § 109(b)(1) allows is well within the outer limits of the Court's nondelegation precedents, see, e. g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388. Statutes need not provide a determinate criterion for saying how much of a regulated harm is too much to avoid delegating legislative power. Pp.472-476.

3. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the implementation issue under § 307 of the CAA. The implementation policy constitutes final agency action under § 307 because it marked the consummation of the EPA's decisionmaking process, see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154. The decision is also ripe for review. The question is purely one of statutory interpretation that would not benefit from further factual development, see Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U. S. 726, 733 review will not interfere with further administrative development and the hardship on respondent States in developing state implementation plans satisfies the CAA's special judicialreview provision permitting pre enforcement review, see id., at 737.

The implementation issue was also fairly included within the challenges to the final ozone rule that were before the Court of Appeals, which all parties agree is final agency action ripe for review. Pp.476-480.

4. The implementation policy is unlawful. Under Chevron U. S. A.

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, if the statute resolves the question whether Subpart 1 or Subpart 2 applies to revised ozone NAAQS, that ends the matter but if the statute is ambiguous, the Court must defer to a reasonable agency interpretation. Here, the statute is ambiguous concerning the interaction between Subpart 1 and Subpart 2, but the Court cannot defer to the EPA's interpretation, which would render Subpart 2's carefully designed restrictions on EPA discretion nugatory once a new ozone NAAQS has been promulgated. The principal distinction between the subparts is that Subpart 2 eliminates regulatory discretion allowed by Subpart 1. The EPA may not construe the statute in a way that completely nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit its discretion. In addition, although Subpart 2 was obviously written to govern implementation for some time into the future, nothing in the EPA's interpretation would have prevented the agency from aborting the subpart the day after it was enacted. It is left to the EPA to develop a reasonable interpretation of the nonattainment implementation provisions insofar as they apply to revised ozone NAAQS. Pp.481-486.

175 F.3d 1027 and 195 F.3d 4, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and IV of which were unanimous, Part II of which was joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., and Part III of which was joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 486. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which SOUTER, J., joined, post, p. 487. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 490.

Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for petitioners in No. 99-1257 and federal respondents in No. 99-1426. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jeffrey P. Minear, Christopher S. Vaden, David J. Kaplan, Mary F. Edgar, Gary S. Guzy, Gerald K. Gleason, and Michael L. Goo.

Edward W Warren argued the cause for American Trucking Associations et al., respondents in No. 99-1257 and cross-petitioners in No. 99-1426. With him on the briefs were Robert R. Gasaway, Jeffrey B. Clark, Daryl Joseffer, Charles Fried, Robin S. Conrad, Beth L. Law, Robert S. Digges, Gary H. Baise, David M. Friedland, Erika Z. Jones, Timothy S. Bishop, Jan S. Amundson, Dimetria G. (Jim) Daskal, Douglas 1. Greenhaus, and Chet M. Thompson. Judith L. French, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for respondents State of Ohio et al. in No. 99-1257. With her on the brief in No. 99-1257 and on the briefs for State of Ohio et al., respondents in support of crosspetitioners in No. 99-1426, were Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, Elise W Porter, Frank J. Reed, Jr., and James G. Tassie, Assistant Attorneys General, Mark J. Rudolph, Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General of Michigan, Thomas Casey, Solicitor General, and Alan F. Hoffman and Pamela J. Stevenson, Assistant Attorneys General. Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Edward G. Bohlen, Assistant Attorney General, Lisa Heinzerling, John J. Farmer, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Howard L. Geduldig and John R. Renella, Deputy Attorneys General, filed briefs for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al., respondents in support of petitioners in No. 99-1257 and respondents in No. 99-1426. Howard 1. Fox filed briefs for the American Lung Association, respondent in support of petitioners in No. 99-1257 and respondent in No. 99-1426. Henry v:

Nickel, F. William Brownell, Lucinda Minton Langworthy, David E. Menotti, William F. Pedersen, Jeffrey A. Knight, G. William Frick, M. Elizabeth Cox, Russel S. Frye, Richard Wasserstrom, Grant Crandall, David F. Zoll, Alexandra Dapolito Dunn, Julie Becker, Harold P. Quinn, Jr., Newman R. Porter, David M. Flannery, and Kurt E. Blase filed briefs for Appalachian Power Co. et al., respondents in

No. 99-1257 and respondents in support of cross-petitioners in No. 99-1426. Robert E. Yuhnke filed a brief for Citizens for Balanced Transportation et al., respondents in No. 99-1426.t

tBriefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D. Bansal, Solicitor General, Daniel X. Smirlock, Deputy Solicitor General, and Lisa Feiner and J. Jared Snyder, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Lockyer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Philip McLaughlin of New Hampshire, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, and William H. Sorrell of Vermont for the State of North Carolina by Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, Daniel C. Oakley, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Marc D. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General for the American Boiler Manufacturers Association by Gene E. Godley and Shannon H. Ratliff II and for the American Crop Protection Association et al. by Herbert L. Fenster and Lawrence S. Ebner.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Theodora P. Berger, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Susan L. Durbin and Sean B. Hecht, Deputy Attorneys General, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Patricia Madrid, Attorney General of New Mexico, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D. Bansal, Solicitor General, and Daniel X. Smirlock, Deputy Solicitor General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, and Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington for the Commonwealth of Virginia by Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, William Hurd, Solicitor General, Roger L. Chaffe, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Stewart T. Leeth, Assistant Attorney General for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants et al. by Theodore B. Olson, Douglas R. Cox, and Mark A. Perry for the Association of American Physicians & Surgeons et al. by Erik S. Jaffe for the Clean Air Trust et al. by Christopher H. Schroeder for the Lincoln Institute for Research and Education et al. by William J. Olson, John S. Miles, Herbert W Titus, and Lawrence J. Straw, Jr. for the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI Inc. et al. by David Schoenbrod and Marci A. Hamilton for the United States Public Interest Research Group

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases present the following questions: (1) Whether § 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) delegates legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EP A). (2) Whether the Administrator may consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under § 109(b)(1). (3) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the EP A's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7501-7515, with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS. (4) If so, whether the EPA's interpretation of that part was permissible.

Section 109(a) of the CAA, as added, 84 Stat. 1679, and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 7409(a), requires the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate NAAQS for each air pollutant for which "air quality criteria" have been issued under § 108, 42 U. S. C. § 7408. Once a N AAQS has been promulgated, the Administrator must review the standard (and the criteria

Education Fund by James Keith Weeks and David M. Driesen and for Senator James H. Inhofe et al. by Paul Rosenzweig.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies et al. by Robert E. Litan for Alcan Aluminum Corp. by Lawrence A. Salibra II for Environmental Defense et al. by Richard L. Revesz and Ann Brewster Weeks for General Electric Co. by Laurence H. Tribe, Jonathan S. Massey, Thomas C. Goldstein, Benjamin W Heineman, Jr., Brackett B. Denniston III, and Matthew Tanzer for the Institute for Justice et al. by William H. Mellor, Clint Bolick, Deborah Simpson, Timothy Lynch, and Ronald D. Rotunda for Intel Corp. et al. by Richard P. Bress, Claudia M. O'Brien, and Gregory S. Slater for the Mercatus Center by Ernest Gelhorn and Ann G. Weymouth for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by M. Reed Hopper for People for the U. S. A. et al. by Christopher C. Horner for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Paul D. Clement, Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar for Senator Orrin Hatch et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Alan Charles Raul, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Lloyd N. Cutler, and C. Boyden Gray and for Gary E. Marchant et al. by Cary Coglianese.

on which it is based) "at five-year intervals" and make "such revisions . as may be appropriate." CAA § 109(d)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 7409(d)(1). These cases arose when, on July 18, 1997, the Administrator revised the NAAQS for particulate matter and ozone. See NAAQS for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38652 (codified in 40 CFR § 50.7 (1999)) NAAQS for Ozone, id., at 38856 (codified in 40 CFR §§ 50.9, 50.10 (1999)). American Trucking Associations, Inc., and its corespondents in No. 99-1257-which include, in addition to other private companies, the States of Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia-challenged the new standards in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b)(1).

The District of Columbia Circuit accepted some of the challenges and rejected others. It agreed with the No. 991257 respondents (hereinafter respondents) that § 109(b)(1) delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 1, because it found that the EP A had interpreted the statute to provide no "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1999). The court thought, however, that the EPA could perhaps avoid the unconstitutional delegation by adopting a restrictive construction of § 109(b)(1), so instead of declaring the section unconstitutional the court remanded the NAAQS to the agency. Id., at 1038. (On this delegation point, Judge Tatel dissented, finding the statute constitutional as written. Id., at 1057.) On the second issue that the Court of Appeals addressed, it unanimously rejected respondents' argument that the court should depart from the rule of Lead Industries Assn., Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (CADC 1980), that the EPA may not consider the cost of implementing a NAAQS in setting the initial standard. It also rejected respondents' argument that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7511-751lf, were

so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard. The court held that although Subpart 2 constrained the agency's method of implementing the new standard, 175 F. 3d, at 1050, it did not prevent the EP A from revising the standard and designating areas of the country as "nonattainment areas," see 42 U. S. C. § 7407(d)(1), by reference to it, 175 F. 3d, at 1047-1048. On the EPA's petition for rehearing, the panel adhered to its position on these points, and unanimously rejected the EPA's new argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to reach the implementation question because there had been no "final" implementation action. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4 (CADC 1999). The Court of Appeals denied the EP A's suggestion for rehearing en bane, with five judges dissenting. Id., at 13.

The Administrator and the EP A petitioned this Court for review of the first, third, and fourth questions described in the first paragraph of this opinion. Respondents conditionally cross-petitioned for review of the second question. We granted certiorari on both petitions, 529 U. S. 1129 (2000) 530 u. S. 1202 (2000), and scheduled the cases for argument in tandem. We have now consolidated the cases for purposes of decision.

In Lead Industries Assn., Inc. v. EPA, supra, at 1148, the District of Columbia Circuit held that "economic considerations [may] play no part in the promulgation of ambient air quality standards under Section 109" of the CAA. In the present cases, the court adhered to that holding, 175 F. 3d, at 1040-1041, as it had done on many other occasions. See, e. g., American Lung Assn. v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388,389 (1998) NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 973 (1990), vacated in part on other grounds, NRDC v. EPA, 921 F.2d 326 (CADC 1991) American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (1981). Respondents argue that these

decisions are incorrect. We disagree and since the first step in assessing whether a statute delegates legislative power is to determine what authority the statute confers, we address that issue of interpretation first and reach respondents' constitutional arguments in Part III, infra.

Section 109(b)(1) instructs the EPA to set primary ambient air quality standards "the attainment and maintenance of which . are requisite to protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety." 42 U. S. C. § 7409(b)(1). Were it not for the hundreds of pages of briefing respondents have submitted on the issue, one would have thought it fairly clear that this text does not permit the EPA to consider costs in setting the standards. The language, as one scholar has noted, "is absolute." D. Currie, Air Pollution:

Federal Law and Analysis 4-15 (1981). The EPA, "based on" the information about health effects contained in the technical "criteria" documents compiled under § 108(a)(2), 42 U. S. C. § 7408(a)(2), is to identify the maximum airborne concentration of a pollutant that the public health can tolerate, decrease the concentration to provide an "adequate" margin of safety, and set the standard at that level. Nowhere are the costs of achieving such a standard made part of that initial calculation.

Against this most natural of readings, respondents make a lengthy, spirited, but ultimately unsuccessful attack. They begin with the object of § 109(b)(1)'s focus, the "public health." When the term first appeared in federal clean air legislation-in the Act of July 14, 1955 (1955 Act), 69 Stat. 322, which expressed "recognition of the dangers to the public health" from air pollution-its ordinary meaning was "[t]he health of the community." Webster's New International Dictionary 2005 (2d ed. 1950). Respondents argue, however, that § 109(b)(1), as added by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1676, meant to use the term's secondary meaning: "[t]he ways and means of conserving the health

of the members of a community, as by preventive medicine, organized care of the sick, etc." Ibid. Words that can have more than one meaning are given content, however, by their surroundings, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132-133 (2000) Jones v. United States, 527 U. S. 373, 389 (1999), and in the context of § 109(b)(1) this second definition makes no sense. Congress could not have meant to instruct the Administrator to set N AAQS at a level "requisite to protect" "the art and science dealing with the protection and improvement of community health." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1836 (1981). We therefore revert to the primary definition of the term: the health of the public.

Even so, respondents argue, many more factors than air pollution affect public health. In particular, the economic cost of implementing a very stringent standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the health gains achieved in cleaning the air-for example, by closing down whole industries and thereby impoverishing the workers and consumers dependent upon those industries. That is unquestionably true, and Congress was unquestionably aware of it. Thus, Congress had commissioned in the Air Quality Act of 1967 (1967 Act) "a detailed estimate of the cost of carrying out the provisions of this Act a comprehensive study of the cost of program implementation by affected units of government and a comprehensive study of the economic impact of air quality standards on the Nation's industries, communities, and other contributing sources of pollution." § 2, 81 Stat. 505. The 1970 Congress, armed with the results of this study, see The Cost of Clean Air, S. Doc. No. 91-40 (1969) (publishing the results of the study), not only anticipated that compliance costs could injure the public health, but provided for that precise exigency. Section 110(f)(1) of the CAA permitted the Administrator to waive the compliance deadline for stationary sources if, inter

alia, sufficient control measures were simply unavailable and "the continued operation of such sources is essential . to the public health or welfare." 84 Stat. 1683 (emphasis added). Other provisions explicitly permitted or required economic costs to be taken into account in implementing the air quality standards. Section 111(b)(1)(B), for example, commanded the Administrator to set "standards of performance" for certain new sources of emissions that as specified in § 111(a)(1) were to "reflec[t] the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated." Section 202(a)(2) prescribed that emissions standards for automobiles could take effect only "after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period." 84 Stat. 1690. See also § 202(b)(5)(C) (similar limitation for interim standards) § 211(c)(2) (similar limitation for fuel additives) § 231(b) (similar limitation for implementation of aircraft emission standards). Subsequent amendments to the CAA have added many more provisions directing, in explicit language, that the Administrator consider costs in performing various duties. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 7545(k)(1) (reformulate gasoline to "require the greatest reduction in emissions . taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emissions reductions") § 7547(a)(3) (emission reduction for nonroad vehicles to be set "giving appropriate consideration to the cost" of the standards). We have therefore refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA an authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U. S. 246, 257, and n. 5 (1976). Cf. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U. S. 530, 538, 541 (1990)

(refusing to infer in certain provisions of the CAA deadlines and enforcement limitations that had been expressly imposed elsewhere).

Accordingly, to prevail in their present challenge, respondents must show a textual commitment of authority to the EPA to consider costs in setting NAAQS under § 109(b)(1). And because § 109(b)(1) and the NAAQS for which it provides are the engine that drives nearly all of Title I of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7401-7515, that textual commitment must be a clear one. Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes. See MC! Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231 (1994) FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., supra, at 159-160. Respondents' textual arguments ultimately founder upon this principle.

Their first claim is that § 109(b)(1)'s terms "adequate margin" and "requisite" leave room to pad health effects with cost concerns. Just as we found it "highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rateregulated to agency discretion-and even more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to 'modify' rate-filing requirements," MC! Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 231, so also we find it implausible that Congress would give to the EPA through these modest words the power to determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards. Accord, Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 590, n. (2000) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The implausibility of Congress's leaving a highly significant issue unaddressed (and thus 'delegating' its resolution to the administering agency) is assuredly one of the factors

to be considered in determining whether there is ambiguity" (emphasis deleted)).l

The same defect inheres in respondents' next two arguments: that while the Administrator's judgment about what is requisite to protect the public health must be "based on [the] criteria" documents developed under § 108(a)(2), see § 109(b)(1), it need not be based solely on those criteria and that those criteria themselves, while they must include "effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air," are not necessarily limited to those effects. Even if we were to concede those premises, we still would not conclude that one of the unenumerated factors that the agency can consider in developing and applying the criteria is cost of implementation. That factor is both so indirectly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn from direct health effects that it would surely have been expressly mentioned in §§ 108 and 109 had Congress meant it to be considered. Yet while those provisions describe in detail how the health effects of pollutants in the ambient air are to be calculated and given effect, see § 108(a)(2), they say not a word about costs.

Respondents point, finally, to a number of provisions in the CAA that do require attainment cost data to be generated. Section 108(b)(1), for example, instructs the Administrator to "issue to the States," simultaneously with the criteria documents, "information on air pollution control techniques, which information shall include data relating to the cost of installation and operation." 42 U. S. C. § 7408(b)(l). And

1 None of the sections of the CAA in which the District of Columbia Circuit has found authority for the EPA to consider costs shares § 109(b)(1)'s prominence in the overall statutory scheme. See, e. g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678-679 (CADC 2000) George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623-624 (CADC 1998) Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1154-1163 (CADC 1987) (en bane).

§ 109(d)(2)(C)(iv) requires the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee to "advise the Administrator of any adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy effects which may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance" of NAAQS.2 42 U. S. C. § 7409(d)(2)(C)(iv). Respondents argue that these provisions make no sense unless costs are to be considered in setting the NAAQS. That is not so. These provisions enable the Administrator to assist the States in carrying out their statutory role as primary implementers of the NAAQS. It is to the States that the CAA assigns initial and primary responsibility for deciding what emissions reductions will be required from which sources. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 7407(a), 7410 (giving States the duty of developing implementation plans). It would be impossible to perform that task intelligently without considering which abatement technologies are most efficient, and most economically feasible-which is why we have said that "the most important forum for consideration of claims of economic and technological infeasibility is before the state agency formulating the implementation plan," Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U. S., at 266. Thus, federal clean air legislation has, from the very beginning, directed federal agencies to develop and transmit implementation data, including cost data, to the States. See 1955 Act,

2 Respondents contend that this advice is required to be included in the NAAQS rulemaking record-which, if true, would suggest that it was relevant to the standard-setting process. But the provision respondents cite for their contention, 42 U. S. C. § 7607(d)(3), requires only that "pertinent findings, recommendations, and comments by the Scientific Review Committee" be included. The Committee's advice concerning certain aspects of "adverse public health . effects" from various attainment strategies is unquestionably pertinent but to say that Committeegenerated cost data are pertinent is to beg the question. Likewise, while "all written comments" must be placed in the docket, § 7607(d)(4)(B)(i), the EPA need respond only to the "significant" ones, § 7407(d)(6)(B) comments regarding cost data are not significant if cost data are irrelevant.

§ 2(b), 69 Stat. 322 Clean Air Act of 1963, amending §§ 3(a), (b) of the CAA, 77 Stat. 394 1967 Act, §§ 103(a)-(d), 104, 107(c), 81 Stat. 486-488. That Congress chose to carry forward this research program to assist States in choosing the means through which they would implement the standards is perfectly sensible, and has no bearing upon whether cost considerations are to be taken into account in formulating the standards.3

It should be clear from what we have said that the canon requiring texts to be so construed as to avoid serious constitutional problems has no application here. No matter how severe the constitutional doubt, courts may choose only between reasonably available interpretations of a text. See, e. g., Miller v. French, 530 U. S. 327, 341 (2000) Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998). The text of § 109(b), interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a whole, unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the matter for us as well as the EPA.4 We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point.

3 Respondents scarcely mention in their arguments the secondary NAAQS required by § 109(b)(2), 42 U. S. C. § 7409(b)(2). For many of the same reasons described in the body of the opinion, as well as the text of § 109(b)(2), which instructs the EPA to set the standards at a level "requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air" (emphasis added), we conclude that the EPA may not consider implementation costs in setting the secondary NAAQS.

4 Respondents' speculation that the EPA is secretly considering the costs of attainment without telling anyone is irrelevant to our interpretive inquiry. If such an allegation could be proved, it would be grounds for vacating the NAAQS, because the Administrator had not followed the law. See, e. g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837,842-843 (1984) Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U. S. 382, 387 (1998). It would not, however, be grounds for this Court's changing the law.

Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA instructs the EPA to set "ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on [the] criteria [documents of § 108] and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health." 42 U. S. C. § 7409(b)(1). The Court of Appeals held that this section as interpreted by the Administrator did not provide an "intelligible principle" to guide the EP A's exercise of authority in setting NAAQS. "[The] EPA," it said, "lack[ed] any determinate criteria for drawing lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too much." 175 F. 3d, at 1034. The court hence found that the EPA's interpretation (but not the statute itself) violated the nondelegation doctrine. Id., at 1038. We disagree.

In a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency. Article I, § 1, of the Constitution vests "[a]lliegislative Powers herein granted . in a Congress of the United States." This text permits no delegation of those powers, Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748, 771 (1996) see id., at 776-777 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and so we repeatedly have said that when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform." J. W Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928). We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute. Both Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 252-253 (1947), and Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 783 (1948), mention agency regulations in the course of their nondelegation discussions, but Lichter did so because a subsequent Congress had incorporated the regulations into a revised version of the statute, ibid., and Fahey because the custom-

ary practices in the area, implicitly incorporated into the statute, were reflected in the regulations, 332 U. S., at 250. The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise-that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted-would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the courts, and an agency's voluntary selfdenial has no bearing upon the answer.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the text of § 109(b)(1) of the CAA at a minimum requires that "[f]or a discrete set of pollutants and based on published air quality criteria that reflect the latest scientific knowledge, [the] EPA must establish uniform national standards at a level that is requisite to protect public health from the adverse effects of the pollutant in the ambient air." Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 99-1257, p. 5. Requisite, in turn, "mean[s] sufficient, but not more than necessary." Id., at 7. These limits on the EPA's discretion are strikingly similar to the ones we approved in Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160 (1991), which permitted the Attorney General to designate a drug as a controlled substance for purposes of criminal drug enforcement if doing so was" 'necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.'" Id., at 163. They also resemble the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 provision requiring the agency to "'set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer any impairment of health' "-which the Court upheld in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 646 (1980), and which even then-JusTIcE REHNQUIST, who alone in that case thought the statute violated the nondelegation doctrine, see id., at 671 (opinion concurring in judgment), would have upheld if, like the statute

here, it did not permit economic costs to be considered. See American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 545 (1981) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

The scope of discretion § 109(b)(1) allows is in fact well within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents. In the history of the Court we have found the requisite "intelligible principle" lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring "fair competition." See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935) A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). We have, on the other hand, upheld the validity of § 11(b)(2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 821, which gave the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to modify the structure of holding company systems so as to ensure that they are not "unduly or unnecessarily complicate[d]" and do not "unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security holders." American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 104 (1946). We have approved the wartime conferral of agency power to fix the prices of commodities at a level that" 'will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the [in some respects conflicting] purposes of thee] Act.'" Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 420, 423-426 (1944). And we have found an "intelligible principle" in various statutes authorizing regulation in the "public interest." See, e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225-226 (1943) (Federal Communications Commission's power to regulate airwaves) New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 24-25 (1932) (Interstate Commerce Commission's power to approve railroad consolidations). In short, we have "almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or apply-

ing the law." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 416 (1989) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) see id., at 373 (majority opinion).

It is true enough that the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred. See Loving v. United States, 517 U. S., at 772-773 United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 556-557 (1975). While Congress need not provide any direction to the EP A regarding the manner in which it is to define "country elevators," which are to be exempt from newstationary-source regulations governing grain elevators, see 42 U. S. C. § 7411(i), it must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire national economy. But even in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never demanded, as the Court of Appeals did here, that statutes provide a "determinate criterion" for saying "how much [of the regulated harm] is too much." 175 F. 3d, at 1034. In Touby, for example, we did not require the statute to decree how "imminent" was too imminent, or how "necessary" was necessary enough, or even-most relevant here-how "hazardous" was too hazardous. 500 U. S., at 165-167. Similarly, the statute at issue in Lichter authorized agencies to recoup "excess profits" paid under wartime Government contracts, yet we did not insist that Congress specify how much profit was too much. 334 U. S., at 783-786. It is therefore not conclusive for delegation purposes that, as respondents argue, ozone and particulate matter are "nonthreshold" pollutants that inflict a continuum of adverse health effects at any airborne concentration greater than zero, and hence require the EPA to make judgments of degree. "[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action." Mistretta v. United States, supra, at 417 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted) see 488 U. S., at 378-379 (majority opinion). Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA, which to repeat we interpret as requiring the EPA to set air quality standards at the level that is "requi-

site"-that is, not lower or higher than is necessary-to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety, fits comfortably within the scope of discretion permitted by our precedent.

We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding for reinterpretation that would avoid a supposed delegation of legislative power. It will remain for the Court of Appeals-on the remand that we direct for other reasons-to dispose of any other preserved challenge to the NAAQS under the judicial-review provisions contained in 42 U. S. C. § 7607(d)(9).

The final two issues on which we granted certiorari concern the EP A's authority to implement the revised ozone NAAQS in areas whose ozone levels currently exceed the maximum level permitted by that standard. The CAA designates such areas "nonattainment," § 107(d)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 7407(d)(1) see also Pub. L. 105-178, § 6103, 112 Stat. 465 (setting timeline for new ozone designations), and it exposes them to additional restrictions over and above the implementation requirements imposed generally by § 110 of the CAA. These additional restrictions are found in the five substantive subparts of Part D of Title I, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7501-7515. Subpart 1, §§ 7501-7509a, contains general nonattainment regulations that pertain to every pollutant for which a NAAQS exists. Subparts 2 through 5, §§ 75117514a, contain rules tailored to specific individual pollutants. Subpart 2, added by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, § 103, 104 Stat. 2423, addresses ozone. 42 U. S. C. §§ 7511751lf. The dispute before us here, in a nutshell, is whether Subpart 1 alone (as the agency determined), or rather Subpart 2 or some combination of Subparts 1 and 2, controls the implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS in nonattainment areas.

The Administrator first urges, however, that we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue because it lacked jurisdiction to review the EP A's implementation policy. Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b)(1), gives the court jurisdiction over "any . nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator," but the EPA argues that its implementation policy was not agency "action," was not "final" action, and is not ripe for review. We reject each of these three contentions.

At the same time the EP A proposed the revised ozone NAAQS in 1996, it also proposed an "interim implementation policy" for the N AAQS, see 61 Fed. Reg. 65752 (1996), that was to govern until the details of implementation could be put in final form through specific "rulemaking actions." The preamble to this proposed policy declared that "the interim implementation policy . represent[s] EP A's preliminary views on these issues and, while it may include various statements that States must take certain actions, these statements are made pursuant to EP A's preliminary interpretations, and thus do not bind the States and public as a matter of law." Ibid. If the EPA had done no more, we perhaps could accept its current claim that its action was not final. However, after the agency had accepted comments on its proposed policy, and on the same day that the final ozone NAAQS was promulgated, the White House published in the Federal Register what it titled a "Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency" that prescribed implementation procedures for the EP A to follow. 62 Fed. Reg. 38421 (1997). (For purposes of our analysis we shall assume that this memorandum was not itself action by the EPA.) The EPA supplemented this memorandum with an explanation of the implementation procedures, which it published in the explanatory preamble to its final ozone

NAAQS under the heading, "Final decision on the primary standard." Id., at 38873. "In light of comments received regarding the interpretation proposed in the Interim Implementation Policy," the EPA announced, it had "reconsidered that interpretation" and settled on a new one. Ibid. The provisions of "subpart 1 of part D of Title I of the Act" will immediately "apply to the implementation of the new 8-hour [ozone] standards." Ibid. see also id., at 38885 (new standard to be implemented "simultaneously [with the old standard] . under the provisions of . subpart 1"). Moreover, the provisions of subpart 2 "will [also] continue to apply as a matter of law for so long as an area is not attaining the [old] i-hour standard." Id., at 38873. Once the area reaches attainment for the old standard, however, "the provisions of subpart 2 will have been achieved and those provisions will no longer apply." Ibid. see also id., at 38884-38885.

We have little trouble concluding that this constitutes final agency action subject to review under § 307. The bite in the phrase "final action" (which bears the same meaning in § 307(b)(1) that it does under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 704, see Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 586 (1980)), is not in the word "action," which is meant to cover comprehensively every manner in which an agency may exercise its power. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U. S. 232, 238, n. 7 (1980). It is rather in the word "final," which requires that the action under review "mark the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 177-178 (1997). Only if the "EP A has rendered its last word on the matter" in question, Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., supra, at 586, is its action "final" and thus reviewable. That standard is satisfied here. The EP A's "decisionmaking process," which began with the 1996 proposal and continued with the reception of public comments, concluded

when the agency, "in light of [these comments]," and in conjunction with a corresponding directive from the White House, adopted the interpretation of Part D at issue here. Since that interpretation issued, the EP A has refused in subsequent rulemakings to reconsider it, explaining to disappointed commenters that its earlier decision was conclusive. See 63 Fed. Reg. 31014, 31018-31019 (1998). Though the agency has not dressed its decision with the conventional procedural accoutrements of finality, its own behavior thus belies the claim that its interpretation is not final.

The decision is also ripe for our review. "Ripeness 'requir[es] us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.'" Texas v. United States, 523 U. S. 296, 300-301 (1998) (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967)). The question before us here is purely one of statutory interpretation that would not "benefit from further factual development of the issues presented." Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U. S. 726, 733 (1998). Nor will our review "inappropriately interfere with further administrative action," ibid., since the EPA has concluded its consideration of the implementation issue. Finally, as for hardship to the parties: The respondent States must-on pain of forfeiting to the EP A control over implementation of the NAAQS-promptly undertake the lengthy and expensive task of developing state implementation plans (SIP's) that will attain the new, more stringent standard within five years. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 7410, 7502. Whether or not this would suffice in an ordinary case brought under the review provisions of the APA, see 5 U. S. C. § 704, we have characterized the special judicial-review provision of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b), as one of those statutes that specifically provides for "preenforcement" review, see Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, supra, at 737. Such statutes, we have said, permit "judicial review directly, even before the

concrete effects normally required for APA review are felt." Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 891 (1990). The effects at issue here surely meet that lower standard.

Beyond all this, the implementation issue was fairly included within the challenges to the final ozone rule that were properly before the Court of Appeals. Respondents argued below that the EPA could not revise the ozone standard, because to do so would trigger the use of Subpart 1, which had been supplanted (for ozone) by the specific rules of Subpart 2. Brief for Industry Petitioners and Intervenors in No. 97-1441 (and consolidated cases) (CADC), pp. 32-34. The EP A responded that Subpart 2 did not supplant but simply supplemented Subpart 1, so that the latter section still "applies to all nonattainment areas for all NAAQS, . including nonattainment areas for any revised ozone standard." Final Brief for EPA in No. 97-1441 (and consolidated cases) (CADC), pp. 67-68. The agency later reiterated that Subpart 2 "does not supplant implementation provisions for revised ozone standards. This interpretation fully harmonizes Subpart 2 with EP A's clear authority to revise any NAAQS." Id., at 71. In other words, the EPA was arguing that the revised standard could be issued, despite its apparent incompatibility with portions of Subpart 2, because it would be implemented under Subpart 1 rather than Subpart 2. The District of Columbia Circuit ultimately agreed that Subpart 2 could be harmonized with the EP A's authority to promulgate revised NAAQS, but not because Subpart 2 is entirely inapplicable-which is one of EPA's assignments of error. It is unreasonable to contend, as the EPA now does, that the Court of Appeals was obligated to reach the agency's preferred result, but forbidden to assess the reasons the EP A had given for reaching that result. The implementation issue was fairly included within respondents' challenge to the ozone rule, which all parties agree is final agency action ripe for review.

Our approach to the merits of the parties' dispute is the familiar one of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). If the statute resolves the question whether Subpart 1 or Subpart 2 (or some combination of the two) shall apply to revised ozone NAAQS, then "that is the end of the matter." Id., at 842843. But if the statute is "silent or ambiguous" with respect to the issue, then we must defer to a "reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id., at 844. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that Subpart 2 clearly controls the implementation of revised ozone NAAQS, see 175 F. 3d, at 1048-1050, because we find the statute to some extent ambiguous. We conclude, however, that the agency's interpretation goes beyond the limits of what is ambiguous and contradicts what in our view is quite clear. We therefore hold the implementation policy unlawful. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 392 (1999).

The text of Subpart 1 at first seems to point the way to a clear answer to the question, which Subpart controls? Two sections of Subpart 1, 7502(a)(1)(C) and 7502(a)(2)(D), contain switching provisions stating that if the classification of ozone nonattainment areas is "specifically provided [for] under other provisions of [Part D]," then those provisions will control instead of Subpart l's. Thus, it is true but incomplete to note, as the Administrator does, that the substantive language of Subpart 1 is broad enough to apply to revised ozone standards. See, e. g., § 7502(a)(1)(A) (instructing the Administrator to classify nonattainment areas according to "any revised standard, including a revision of any standard in effect on November 15, 1990") § 7502(a)(2)(A) (setting attainment deadlines). To determine whether that language does apply one must resolve the further textual issue whether some other provision, namely Subpart 2, provides for the classification of ozone nonattainment areas. If

it does, then according to the switching provisions of Subpart 1 it will control.

So, does Subpart 2 provide for classifying nonattainment ozone areas under the revised standard? It unquestionably does. The backbone of the subpart is Table 1, printed in § 7511(a)(1) and reproduced in the margin here,5 which defines five categories of ozone nonattainment areas and prescribes attainment deadlines for each. Section 7511(a)(1) funnels all nonattainment areas into the table for classification, declaring that "[e]ach area designated nonattainment for ozone . shall be classified at the time of such designation, under table 1, by operation of law." And once an area has been classified, "the primary standard attainment date for ozone shall be as expeditiously as practicable but not later than the date provided in table 1." The EPA argues that this text is not as clear or comprehensive as it seems, because the title of § 7511(a) reads "Classification and attainment dates for 1989 nonattainment areas," which suggests that Subpart 2 applies only to areas that were in nonattainment in 1989, and not to areas later designated non-

TABLE 1
Area classDesign value*Primary standard
attainment date**
Marginal . 0.121 up to 0.138 . 3 years after
November 15, 1990
Moderate. 0.138 up to 0.160 . 6 years after
November 15, 1990
Serious . 0.160 up to 0.180 . 9 years after
November 15, 1990
Severe . 0.180 up to 0.280 . 15 years after
November 15, 1990
Extreme. 0.280 and above . 20 years after
November 15, 1990

attainment under a revised ozone standard. The suggestion must be rejected, however, because § 7511(b)(1) specifically provides for the classification of areas that were in attainment in 1989 but have subsequently slipped into nonattainment. It thus makes clear that Subpart 2 is not limited solely to 1989 nonattainment areas. This eliminates the interpretive role of the title, which may only "she[d] light on some ambiguous word or phrase in the statute itself," Carter v. United States, 530 U. S. 255, 267 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S., at 212, in turn quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528-529 (1947)).

It may well be, as the EPA argues-and as the concurring opinion below on denial of rehearing pointed out, see 195 F. 3d, at 11-12-that some provisions of Subpart 2 are ill fitted to implementation of the revised standard. U sing the old i-hour averages of ozone levels, for example, as Subpart 2 requires, see § 7511(a)(1) 44 Fed. Reg. 8202 (1979), would produce at best an inexact estimate of the new 8-hour averages, see 40 CFR § 50.10, and App. I (1999). Also, to the extent that the new ozone standard is stricter than the old one, see Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 99-1257, p. 17 ("the stricter 8-hour NAAQS") 62 Fed. Reg. 38856, 38858 (1997) (8-hour standard of 0.09 ppm rather than 0.08 ppm would have "generally represent[ed] the continuation of the [old] level of protection"), the classification system of Subpart 2 contains a gap, because it fails to classify areas whose ozone levels are greater than the new standard (and thus nonattaining) but less than the approximation of the old standard codified by Table 1. And finally, Subpart 2's method for calculating attainment dates-which is simply to count forward a certain number of years from November 15, 1990 (the date the 1990 CAA Amendments took force), depending on how far out of attainment the area started-seems to make no sense for areas that are first classified under a new standard after November 15, 1990.

If, for example, areas were classified in the year 2000, many of the deadlines would already have expired at the time of classification.

These gaps in Subpart 2's scheme prevent us from concluding that Congress clearly intended Subpart 2 to be the exclusive, permanent means of enforcing a revised ozone standard in nonattainment areas. The statute is in our view ambiguous concerning the manner in which Subpart 1 and Subpart 2 interact with regard to revised ozone standards, and we would defer to the EP A's reasonable resolution of that ambiguity. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S., at 132 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 424 (1999). We cannot defer, however, to the interpretation the EPA has given.

Whatever effect may be accorded the gaps in Subpart 2 as implying some limited applicability of Subpart 1, they cannot be thought to render Subpart 2's carefully designed restrictions on EPA discretion utterly nugatory once a new standard has been promulgated, as the EP A has concluded. The principal distinction between Subpart 1 and Subpart 2 is that the latter eliminates regulatory discretion that the former allowed. While Subpart 1 permits the EPA to establish classifications for nonattainment areas, Subpart 2 classifies areas as a matter of law based on a table. Compare § 7502(a)(1) with § 7511(a)(1) (Table 1). Whereas the EPA has discretion under Subpart 1 to extend attainment dates for as long as 12 years, under Subpart 2 it may grant no more than 2 years' extension. Compare §§ 7502(a)(2)(A) and (C) with § 7511(a)(5). Whereas Subpart 1 gives the EPA considerable discretion to shape nonattainment programs, Subpart 2 prescribes large parts of them by law. Compare §§ 7502(c) and (d) with § 7511a. Yet according to the EPA, Subpart 2 was simply Congress's "approach to the implementation of the [old] i-hour" standard, and so there was no reason that "the new standard could not simultaneously be implemented under . subpart 1." 62 Fed. Reg.

38856, 38885 (1997) see also id., at 38873 ("[T]he provisions of subpart 1 . would apply to the implementation of the new 8-hour ozone standards"). To use a few apparent gaps in Subpart 2 to render its textually explicit applicability to nonattainment areas under the new standard utterly inoperative is to go over the edge of reasonable interpretation. The EPA may not construe the statute in a way that completely nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit its discretion.

The EP A's interpretation making Subpart 2 abruptly obsolete is all the more astonishing because Subpart 2 was obviously written to govern implementation for some time. Some of the elements required to be included in SIP's under Subpart 2 were not to take effect until many years after the passage of the CAA. See § 7511a(e)(3) (restrictions on "electric utility and industrial and commercial boiler[s]" to be "effective 8 years after November 15, 1990") § 7511a(c)(5)(A) (vehicle monitoring program to "[b]egi[n] 6 years after November 15, 1990") § 7511a(g)(1) (emissions milestone requirements to be applied "6 years after November 15, 1990, and at intervals of every 3 years thereafter"). A plan reaching so far into the future was not enacted to be abandoned the next time the EP A reviewed the ozone standard-which Congress knew could happen at any time, since the technical staff papers had already been completed in late 1989. See 58 Fed. Reg. 13008, 13010 (1993) see also 42 U. S. C. § 7409(d)(1) (NAAQS must be reviewed and, if appropriate, revised at least once every five years). Yet nothing in the EPA's interpretation would have prevented the agency from aborting Subpart 2 the day after it was enacted. Even now, if the EP A's interpretation were correct, some areas of the country could be required to meet the new, more stringent ozone standard in at most the same time that Subpart 2 had allowed them to meet the old standard. Compare § 7502(a)(2) (Subpart 1 attainment dates) with § 7511(a) (Subpart 2 attainment dates). Los Angeles, for instance, "would

486 WHITMAN v. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC.

be required to attain the revised NAAQS under Subpart 1 no later than the same year that marks the outer time limit for attaining Subpart 2's one-hour ozone standard." Brief for Petitioners in No. 99-1257, p. 49. An interpretation of Subpart 2 so at odds with its structure and manifest purpose cannot be sustained.

We therefore find the EPA's implementation policy to be unlawful, though not in the precise respect determined by the Court of Appeals. After our remand, and the Court of Appeals' final disposition of these cases, it is left to the EPA to develop a reasonable interpretation of the nonattainment implementation provisions insofar as they apply to revised ozone NAAQS.

To summarize our holdings in these unusually complex cases: (1) The EPA may not consider implementation costs in setting primary and secondary NAAQS under § 109(b) of the CAA. (2) Section 109(b)(1) does not delegate legislative power to the EPA in contravention of Art. I, § 1, of the Constitution. (3) The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the EP A's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, relating to the implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS. (4) The EPA's interpretation of that Part is unreasonable.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.

I agree with the majority that § 109's directive to the agency is no less an "intelligible principle" than a host of other directives that we have approved. Ante, at 474-476. I also agree that the Court of Appeals' remand to the agency to make its own corrective interpretation does not accord with our understanding of the delegation issue. Ante, at 472-473. I write separately, however, to express my con-

cern that there may nevertheless be a genuine constitutional problem with § 109, a problem which the parties did not address.

The parties to these cases who briefed the constitutional issue wrangled over constitutional doctrine with barely a nod to the text of the Constitution. Although this Court since 1928 has treated the "intelligible principle" requirement as the only constitutional limit on congressional grants of power to administrative agencies, see J. W Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928), the Constitution does not speak of "intelligible principles." Rather, it speaks in much simpler terms: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added). I am not convinced that the intelligible principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power. I believe that there are cases in which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than "legislative."

As it is, none of the parties to these cases has examined the text of the Constitution or asked us to reconsider our precedents on cessions of legislative power. On a future day, however, I would be willing to address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders' understanding of separation of powers.

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Section 109(b)(1) delegates to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). In Part III of its opinion, ante, at 472-476, the Court convincingly explains why the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that § 109 effected "an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (CADC 1999) (per curiam).

I wholeheartedly endorse the Court's result and endorse its explanation of its reasons, albeit with the following caveat.

The Court has two choices. We could choose to articulate our ultimate disposition of this issue by frankly acknowledging that the power delegated to the EPA is "legislative" but nevertheless conclude that the delegation is constitutional because adequately limited by the terms of the authorizing statute. Alternatively, we could pretend, as the Court does, that the authority delegated to the EPA is somehow not "legislative power." Despite the fact that there is language in our opinions that supports the Court's articulation of our holding,l I am persuaded that it would be both wiser and more faithful to what we have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking authority is "legislative power." 2

The proper characterization of governmental power should generally depend on the nature of the power, not on the identity of the person exercising it. See Black's Law Dictionary 899 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "legislation" as, inter alia, "[f]ormulation of rule[s] for the future") 1 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.3, p. 37 (3d ed. 1994) ("If legislative power means the power to make rules of conduct that bind everyone based on resolution of major policy issues, scores of agencies exercise legislative power routinely by

1 See, e. g., Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, 165 (1991) United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77, 85 (1932) J. W Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 407 (1928) Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692 (1892).

2 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society . Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power . "). See also Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748, 758 (1996) ("[The nondelegation] principle does not mean . that only Congress can make a rule of prospective force") 1 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6, p. 66 (3d ed. 1994) ("Except for two 1935 cases, the Court has never enforced its frequently announced prohibition on congressional delegation of legislative power").

promulgating what are candidly called 'legislative rules' "). If the N AAQS that the EP A promulgated had been prescribed by Congress, everyone would agree that those rules would be the product of an exercise of "legislative power." The same characterization is appropriate when an agency exercises rulemaking authority pursuant to a permissible delegation from Congress.

My view is not only more faithful to normal English usage, but is also fully consistent with the text of the Constitution. In Article I, the Framers vested "All legislative Powers" in the Congress, Art. I, § 1, just as in Article II they vested the "executive Power" in the President, Art. II, § 1. Those provisions do not purport to limit the authority of either recipient of power to delegate authority to others. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 752 (1986) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("Despite the statement in Article I of the Constitution that 'All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,' it is far from novel to acknowledge that independent agencies do indeed exercise legislative powers") INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 985-986 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("[L]egislative power can be exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments . ") 1 Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.6, at 66 ("The Court was probably mistaken from the outset in interpreting Article 1's grant of power to Congress as an implicit limit on Congress' authority to delegate legislative power"). Surely the authority granted to members of the Cabinet and federal law enforcement agents is properly characterized as "Executive" even though not exercised by the President. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 705-706 (1988) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (arguing that the independent counsel exercised "executive power" unconstrained by the President).

It seems clear that an executive agency's exercise of rulemaking authority pursuant to a valid delegation from Congress is "legislative." As long as the delegation provides a

490 WHITMAN v. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC.

sufficiently intelligible principle, there is nothing inherently unconstitutional about it. Accordingly, while I join Parts I, II, and IV of the Court's opinion, and agree with almost everything said in Part III, I would hold that when Congress enacted § 109, it effected a constitutional delegation of legislative power to the EP A.

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion. I also agree with the Court's determination in Part II that the Clean Air Act does not permit the Environmental Protection Agency to consider the economic costs of implementation when setting national ambient air quality standards under § 109(b)(1) of the Act. But I would not rest this conclusion solely upon § 109's language or upon a presumption, such as the Court's presumption that any authority the Act grants the EP A to consider costs must flow from a "textual commitment" that is "clear." Ante, at 468. In order better to achieve regulatory goals-for example, to allocate resources so that they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment-regulators must often take account of all of a proposed regulation's adverse effects, at least where those adverse effects clearly threaten serious and disproportionate public harm. Hence, I believe that, other things being equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this type of rational regulation.

In these cases, however, other things are not equal. Here, legislative history, along with the statute's structure, indicates that § 109's language reflects a congressional decision not to delegate to the agency the legal authority to consider economic costs of compliance.

For one thing, the legislative history shows that Congress intended the statute to be "technology forcing." Senator Edmund Muskie, the primary sponsor of the 1970 amend-

ments to the Act, introduced them by saying that Congress' primary responsibility in drafting the Act was not "to be limited by what is or appears to be technologically or economically feasible," but "to establish what the public interest requires to protect the health of persons," even if that means that "industries will be asked to do what seems to be impossible at the present time." 116 Congo Rec. 32901-32902 (1970), 1 Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-18,

The Senate directly focused upon the technical feasibility and cost of implementing the Act's mandates. And it made clear that it intended the Administrator to develop air quality standards set independently of either. The Senate Report for the 1970 amendments explains:

"In the Committee discussions, considerable concern was expressed regarding the use of the concept of technical feasibility as the basis of ambient air standards. The Committee determined that 1) the health of people is more important than the question of whether the early achievement of ambient air quality standards protective of health is technically feasible and, 2) the growth of pollution load in many areas, even with application of available technology, would still be deleterious to public health .

"Therefore, the Committee determined that existing sources of pollutants either should meet the standard of the law or be closed down . " S. Rep. No. 91-1196, pp. 2-3 (1970), 1 Leg. Hist. 402-403 (emphasis added).

Indeed, this Court, after reviewing the entire legislative history, concluded that the 1970 amendments were "expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be economically or technologically infeasible." Union Elec. Co.

v. EPA, 427 U. S. 246, 257 (1976) (emphasis added). And the Court added that the 1970 amendments were intended to be a "drastic remedy to . a serious and otherwise uncheckable problem." Id., at 256. Subsequent legislative history confirms that the technology-forcing goals of the 1970 amendments are still paramount in to day's Act. See Clean Air Conference Report (1977): Statement of Intent Clarification of Select Provisions, 123 Congo Rec. 27070 (1977) (stating, regarding the 1977 amendments to the Act, that "this year's legislation retains and even strengthens the technology forcing . goals of the 1970 Act") S. Rep. No. 101-228, p.5 (1989) (stating that the 1990 amendments to the Act require ambient air quality standards to be set at "the level that 'protects the public health' with an 'adequate margin of safety,' without regard to the economic or technical feasibility of attainment" (emphasis added)).

To read this legislative history as meaning what it says does not impute to Congress an irrational intent. Technology-forcing hopes can prove realistic. Those persons, for example, who opposed the 1970 Act's insistence on a 90% reduction in auto emission pollutants, on the ground of excessive cost, saw the development of catalytic converter technology that helped achieve substantial reductions without the economic catastrophe that some had feared. See § 6(a) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, amending §§ 202(b)(1)(A), (B), 84 Stat. 1690 (codified at 42 U. S. C. §§ 7521(b)(1)(A), (B)) (requiring a 90% reduction in emissions) 1 Leg. Hist. 238, 240 (statement of Sen. Griffin) (arguing that the emissions standards could "force [the automobile] industry out of existence" because costs "would not be taken into account") see generally Reitze, Mobile Source Air Pollution Control, 6 Env. Law. 309, 326-327 (2000) (discussing the development of the catalytic converter).

At the same time, the statute's technology-forcing objective makes regulatory efforts to determine the costs of implementation both less important and more difficult. It

means that the relevant economic costs are speculative, for they include the cost of unknown future technologies. It also means that efforts to take costs into account can breed time-consuming and potentially unresolvable arguments about the accuracy and significance of cost estimates. Congress could have thought such efforts not worth the delays and uncertainties that would accompany them. In any event, that is what the statute's history seems to say. See Union Elec., supra, at 256-259. And the matter is one for Congress to decide.

Moreover, the Act does not, on this reading, wholly ignore cost and feasibility. As the majority points out, ante, at 466-467, the Act allows regulators to take those concerns into account when they determine how to implement ambient air quality standards. Thus, States may consider economic costs when they select the particular control devices used to meet the standards, and industries experiencing difficulty in reducing their emissions can seek an exemption or variance from the state implementation plan. See Union Elec., supra, at 266 ("[T]he most important forum for consideration of claims of economic and technological infeasibility is before the state agency formulating the implementation plan").

The Act also permits the EPA, within certain limits, to consider costs when it sets deadlines by which areas must attain the ambient air quality standards. 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2)(A) (providing that "the Administrator may extend the attainment date . for a period no greater than 10 years from the date of designation as nonattainment, considering the severity of nonattainment and the availability and feasibility of pollution control measures") § 7502(a)(2)(C) (permitting the Administrator to grant up to two additional i-year extensions) cf. §§ 7511(a)(1), (5) (setting more rigid attainment deadlines for areas in nonattainment of the ozone standard, but permitting the Administrator to grant up to two i-year extensions). And Congress can change those statutory limits if necessary. Given the ambient air quality

standards' substantial effects on States, cities, industries, and their suppliers and customers, Congress will hear from those whom compliance deadlines affect adversely, and Congress can consider whether legislative change is warranted. See, e. g., Steel Industry Compliance Extension Act of 1981, 95 Stat. 139 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 7413(e) (1988 ed.)) (repealed 1990) (granting the Administrator discretion to extend the ambient air quality standard attainment date set in the 1977 Act by up to three years for steelmaking facilities).

Finally, contrary to the suggestion of the Court of Appeals and of some parties, this interpretation of § 109 does not require the EPA to eliminate every health risk, however slight, at any economic cost, however great, to the point of "hurtling" industry over "the brink of ruin," or even forcing "deindustrialization." American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1037, 1038, n. 4 (CADC 1999) see also Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 99-1426, p. 25. The statute, by its express terms, does not compel the elimination of all risk and it grants the Administrator sufficient flexibility to avoid setting ambient air quality standards ruinous to industry.

Section 109(b)(1) directs the Administrator to set standards that are "requisite to protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of safety." But these words do not describe a world that is free of all risk-an impossible and undesirable objective. See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 642 (1980) (plurality opinion) (the word "safe" does not mean "riskfree"). Nor are the words "requisite" and "public health" to be understood independent of context. We consider football equipment "safe" even if its use entails a level of risk that would make drinking water "unsafe" for consumption. And what counts as "requisite" to protecting the public health will similarly vary with background circumstances, such as the public's ordinary tolerance of the particular health risk in the particular context at issue. The Administrator can

consider such background circumstances when "decid[ing] what risks are acceptable in the world in which we live." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1165 (CADC 1987).

The statute also permits the Administrator to take account of comparative health risks. That is to say, she may consider whether a proposed rule promotes safety overall. A rule likely to cause more harm to health than it prevents is not a rule that is "requisite to protect the public health." For example, as the Court of Appeals held and the parties do not contest, the Administrator has the authority to determine to what extent possible health risks stemming from reductions in tropospheric ozone (which, it is claimed, helps prevent cataracts and skin cancer) should be taken into account in setting the ambient air quality standard for ozone. See 175 F. 3d, at 1050-1053 (remanding for the Administrator to make that determination).

The statute ultimately specifies that the standard set must be "requisite to protect the public health" "in the judgment of the Administrator," § 109(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1680 (emphasis added), a phrase that grants the Administrator considerable discretionary standard-setting authority.

The statute's words, then, authorize the Administrator to consider the severity of a pollutant's potential adverse health effects, the number of those likely to be affected, the distribution of the adverse effects, and the uncertainties surrounding each estimate. Cf. Sun stein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303, 364 (1999). They permit the Administrator to take account of comparative health consequences. They allow her to take account of context when determining the acceptability of small risks to health. And they give her considerable discretion when she does so.

This discretion would seem sufficient to avoid the extreme results that some of the industry parties fear. After all, the EPA, in setting standards that "protect the public health"

with "an adequate margin of safety," retains discretionary authority to avoid regulating risks that it reasonably concludes are trivial in context. Nor need regulation lead to deindustrialization. Preindustrial society was not a very healthy society hence a standard demanding the return of the Stone Age would not prove "requisite to protect the public health."

Although I rely more heavily than does the Court upon legislative history and alternative sources of statutory flexibility, I reach the same ultimate conclusion. Section 109 does not delegate to the EPA authority to base the national ambient air quality standards, in whole or in part, upon the economic costs of compliance.

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